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What Developments in Western Europe
Tell Us about American Critiques of
Corporate Criminal Liability†
Sara Sun Beale†† and Adam G. Safwat†††
Although corporate criminal liability has been
recognized in the United States for nearly a century,1
contemporary academic commentators have questioned its
legitimacy and argued that it is inferior to its alternatives:
civil liability for the corporation and/or criminal liability for
individual corporate agents. Other academic critics have
attacked the present definitions of corporate criminal
liability.2 In other words, although corporate criminal
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1. The seminal case recognizing corporate criminal liability is New York
Central & Hudson River R.R. Co. v. United States, 212 U.S. 481 (1909). For a
general discussion of the history of corporate criminal liability in the United
States, see Kathleen F. Brickey, Corporate Criminal Liability § 1:01-1:19 (2d ed.
1992), and 1 Sarah N. Welling, Sara Sun Beale, & Pamela H. Bucy, Federal
Criminal Law and Related Actions: Crimes, Forfeiture, the False Claims Act and
Rico § 5.2 (1998).
2. For examples of influential proposals to restrict or reframe the scope of
respondeat superior liability, see Model Penal Code § 2.07(1)(c) (Proposed Official
Draft 1962) & cmt. 2(c) (Official Draft and Revised Comments 1985) (restricting
corporate liability to criminal conduct performed, participated in, or recklessly
tolerated by the board of directors or corporate officers or agents whose positions
in the corporate hierarchy are high enough that they may reasonably be deemed
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liability has also had its academic champions, it has been
under attack in the United States. The situation in Europe
poses a sharp contrast. Europe does not have a long
history of recognizing corporate criminal liability. In the
last quarter of the twentieth century, however, many
Western European nations have created criminal liability
for corporations. The juxtaposition of these European and
American trends raises the question we wish to explore: if
corporate criminal liability is so controversial in the United
States, why are many Western European countries
creating or expanding the criminal liability of corporations?
Or, to turn the question around, what can we learn from
the European experience that might shed light on the
academic dispute in the United States about the
justifications
for
imposing
criminal
liability
on
corporations?3
This debate takes on added significance in view of the
remarkable litany of corporate misconduct that has come to
to have the authority to set policy for the corporation); Jennifer Arlen, The
Potentially Perverse Effects of Corporate Criminal Liability, 23 J. Legal Stud.
833, 848-49 (1994) (arguing that a strict regime of vicarious corporate liability can
have the perverse effect of discouraging socially desirable corporate monitoring);
Pamela H. Bucy, Corporate Ethos: A Standard for Corporate Criminal Liability,
75 Minn. L. Rev. 1095, 1099 (1991) (proposing that corporate liability be based
upon corporate “ethos,” or personality, in order to limit criminal liability to cases
where the criminal conduct in question is consistent with corporate goals, policies,
and ethos, rather than the result of actions by one or two maverick employees);
Jennifer Arlen & Reinier Kraakman, Controlling Corporate Misconduct: An
Analysis of Corporate Liability Regimes, 72 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 687, 736 (1997)
(arguing in favor of imposing high sanctions based on vicarious liability but
mitigating those sanctions based upon the corporation’s compliance activities).
The United States Sentencing Commission has proposed a major revision of the
corporate sentencing guidelines that may be seen as a response to these critiques.
Amendments to the Sentencing Guidelines, Effective Compliance and Ethics
Programs in Chapter Eight, 69 Fed. Reg. 28994, 29018-25, (§ 8B2.1, § 8C2.5(g)
§ 8C2.5(f), § 8D1.4(c), § 8F1.1)
(proposed April 30, 2004), available at
http://www.ussc.gov/2004guid/2004cong.pdf. These Amendments will be effective
in November 2004 unless Congress intervenes.
3. For a sobering description of the difficulties that attend all comparative
analyses, see Jonathan B. Wiener, Whose Precaution After All? A Comment on
the Comparison and Evolution of Risk Regulatory Systems, 13 Duke J. Comp. &
Int’l L. 207, 248-53 (2003); see also Herbert L. Bernstein, Whose Advantage After
All? A Comment on the Comparison of Civil Justice Systems, 21 U.C. Davis L.
Rev. 587 (1988).
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light in both the U.S. and Europe in recent years.
Following the 1990s, a decade that saw a wave of antitrust,
environmental, and fraud prosecutions of major
corporations,4 the new century began with a series of
corporate accounting scandals that rocked the stock
markets, destroyed billions in equity, and caused the loss of
tens, if not hundreds, of thousands of jobs. In the United
States, the most prominent example was Enron (formerly
the seventh most valuable company in the United States),5
which has lost approximately $100 billion in shareholder
equity6 and eventually filed for bankruptcy after the
revelation that it had systematically used special purpose
entities to shift debt off its books and hide corporate losses.7
As of July 2004, thirty-one persons connected to Enron had
been indicted, and roughly one third of those have been
convicted.8 Enron’s auditor, Arthur Andersen LLP, one of
the largest accounting firms in the world, was charged with
and convicted of one count of obstruction of justice in
relation to its Enron activities.9 Anderson subsequently
4. For an interesting list of the 100 most serious corporate criminal crimes of the
1990s (ranked by the size of the criminal fine imposed), see Russell Mokhiber, Top 100
Corporate Criminals of the Decade, at http://www.corporatepredators.org/top100.html
(visited May 31, 2004). The offenses fell into fourteen categories of crime:
Environmental (38), antitrust (20), fraud (13), campaign finance (7), food and drug (6),
financial crimes (4), false statements (3), illegal exports (3), illegal boycott (1), worker
death (1), bribery (1), obstruction of justice (1), public corruption (1), and tax evasion
(1). Nine of the twenty five most serious cases involved antitrust violations; the fines
in those nine cases totaled approximately $1.2 billion. The largest single fine, $500
million, was imposed upon F. Hoffmann-La Roche Ltd. in 1999 for leading a
worldwide conspiracy to fix and raise prices and allocate market shares for vitamins.
Id. at 15. Mokhiber, the editor of the Corporate Crime Reporter, draws his data from
that publication.
5. Bill Wasik, Dismal Beat: The March of Personal-Finance Journalism,
Harper’s Magazine, March 1, 2003, at 81.
6. Our View; Corporate Cruelty, Press Enterprise (Riverside, CA), February
23, 2004, at A10.
7. Kathleen F. Brickey, Enron’s Legacy, 8 Buff. Crim. L. Rev. 221, 222-23
(2004). Over 6,500 employees lost their jobs and pensions while Enron executives
awarded themselves $55 million in bonuses. Id.
8. Robert Manor & Howard Witt, Lay Charged with Massive Conspiracy; ExEnron CEO Pleads Innocent, Chicago Tribune, July 9, 2004, at C1.
9. Kathleen F. Brickey, Andersen’s Fall from Grace, 81 Wash. U. L.Q. 917,
919-21 (2003). Andersen’s Enron team shredded Enron-related documents until
the company had been “officially served” by the SEC. Under SEC rules, a felony
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closed its public auditing practice in August 2002, reducing
its workforce from 28,000 U.S.-based partners and
employees to fewer than 3,000.10
Many other major American corporations also
misrepresented their finances, inflating earnings and
assets, and concealing and mischaracterizing expenses.
These included other energy companies,11 including
Dynergy. The disclosure of Dynergy’s use of fictive “round
trip” energy trades to create an appearance of active
trading resulted in losses estimated at $100 million.12
Technology and communications companies,13 including
Adelphia Communications,14 WorldCom,15 and Global
conviction disqualifies a company from auditing public companies unless the firm
receives a waiver.
10. Id. at 917 n.1. The principle function of its remaining operation is winding
up its business affairs.
11. Royal Dutch/Shell Group, the world’s third largest oil company, reduced
its estimates of its proven reserves of oil and natural gas by 20 percent, or 3.9
billion barrels, nearly two years after internal documents suggest that top
executives may have known about the overstatement. Stephen Labaton & Jeff
Gerth, At Shell, New Accounting and Rosier Oil Outlook, N.Y. Times, March 12,
2004, at A1. In May 2004, El Paso Corporation announced that it would reduce
its estimates of proven oil and natural gas reserves by 41 percent, or 1.8 trillion
cubic feet, because several employees had deliberately overstated its reserves.
Heather Timmons, El Paso Says Reserves May Have Been Falsified, N.Y. Times,
May 4, 2004, at C14. Reliant Energy and four corporate officials were indicted for
illegal activities during the California energy crisis in 2000, when the corporation
allegedly executed illegal “round trip” trades in which the same electricity would
be bought and sold at the same price, creating the illusion of trading activity to
artificially increase the price of electricity. Former Reliant Electricity Trader
Agrees to $25,000 Fine, Los Angeles Times, May 11, 2004, at C2.
12. Simon Romero, Stiff Sentence Is Possibility for a Name Not so Known,
N.Y. Times, March 24, 2004, at C1. Prosecutors reached this estimate by
measuring the decline in Dynergy’s stock—from $56.99 in April 2001 to $0.86 in
August 2002.
13. In April 2004, Computer Associates, the fourth largest independent
software company with 16,000 employees and more than $3 billion in sales,
acknowledged that it had backdated $1.8 billion in contracts in the fiscal year
ended March 2000, which amounted to nearly 30 percent of its total sales that
year. Although the investigation is ongoing, four former executives have already
pleaded guilty to securities fraud or obstruction of justice. Alex Berenson,
Computer Associates Restates Timing of $2.2 Billion in Sales, N.Y. Times, April
27, 2004, at C1.
14. In March 2002, Adelphia, the sixth largest cable operation in the United
States, disclosed that company assets had been used as collateral for $2.3 billion
in secret loans to company executives who had artificially inflated earnings,
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Crossing16 also suffered massive losses when their
fraudulent accounting practices were revealed. In the
health care industry, HealthSouth, the nation’s largest
operator of rehabilitation hospitals and surgery centers,
engaged in an accounting fraud that inflated earnings and
assets by as much as $4.6 billion in order to meet Wall
Street forecasts.17
Major European corporations also employed similar
deceptive practices. Parmalat (a dairy-food giant which
was the eighth largest industrial group in Italy and
represented .8% of the country’s GDP18) collapsed in late
2003 after the revelation that it had falsified its earning
reports for thirteen years, while it was losing billions of
dollars, and claimed assets in a bank account that did not
exist.19 Furthermore, nearly 4 billion Euros in market
value was lost after the disclosure that Royal Ahold,20 a
hidden billions of dollars of debt, and improperly inflated subscriber numbers to
artificially improve its financial standing. The founder of Adelphia and its chief
financial officer have been convicted of conspiracy, bank fraud, and securities
fraud. Barry Meier, 2 Guilty in Fraud at a Cable Giant, New York Times, July 9,
2004, at A1. To date, no criminal charges have been filed against the company.
Carrie Johnson, Trial Against Adelphia Executives to Open; Father, 2 Sons Face
Criminal Charges in Wide-Ranging Fraud Investigation, The Washington Post,
February 23, 2004, at A05.
15. In 2002, WorldCom announced a multi-billion dollar second-quarter
charge to write down some acquired operations and subsequently revealed
fraudulent accounting practices that had improperly classified $3.8 billion in
ordinary expenses as capital expenditures. In March 2004, WorldCom reduced its
combined pretax profits for 2000 and 2001 by $74.4 billion. Although charges
have been filed against company executives, to date, no criminal charges have
been filed against the company. WorldCom Restates Profits by $74.4 Billion for 2
Years, N.Y. Times, March 13, 2004, at C14.
16. In 2002, Global Crossing collapsed under $12.4 billion in debt. The
company allegedly counted the telecom capacity it sold to other
telecommunications firms as revenue but failed to list as an ordinary expense the
cost of buying capacity from others. No charges were filed against the company or
its executives. Singapore Group Takes Global Crossing out of Bankruptcy,
Channel NewsAsia, December 10, 2003.
17. Brickey, supra note 7, at 222-23. By May 2003, fourteen executives were
investigated and the CEO was indicted in November 2003. Id.
18. Sophie Arie, Parmalat Dream Goes Sour, The Observer, January 4, 2004,
at 3.
19. Gail Edmondson & Laura Cohn, How Parmalat Went Sour, Business
Week, January 12, 2004, at 46.
20. Gregory Crouch & Sherri Day, Another Ahold Executive Resigns in Wake
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Dutch company that had been the world’s third largest food
retailer,21 had overstated its earnings by more than a
billion dollars.22
Other corporate wrongdoing involved breaches of
environmental or health and safety laws. Three major
cruise lines—Carnival, Norwegian, and Royal Caribbean—
pleaded guilty to charges involving the dumping of waste
oil, dry cleaning chemicals, and other toxic substances, and
falsifying records to conceal this conduct.23
Smaller
domestic companies violated the Clean Water Act by
discharging wastewater into sewers, surface waters, and
wetlands.24
Olympic Pipe Line Co. was convicted of
violating the 1979 Pipeline Safety Act as a result of a
pipeline rupture that killed three people in a park in
Washington.25 Virtually all of the major pharmaceutical
companies are being investigated or have settled or plead
guilty to charges of serious misconduct. Pfizer, the world’s
largest pharmaceutical company, plead guilty and agreed
to pay $430 million to resolve criminal and civil charges
that it paid doctors to prescribe an epilepsy drug to
patients with ailments that the drug was not federally
approved to treat,26 despite a study showing the drug was
of Scandal, N.Y. Times, May 14, 2003, at C5.
21. Dutch Grocer Tries for New Start with Write-Down, N.Y. Times, October
3, 2003, at W1.
22. Gregory Couch, At Ahold, Past Errors Shadow the Future, N.Y. Times,
November 25, 2003, at W1.
23. Marilyn Adams, Cruise Ship Dumping Poisons Seas, Frustrates U.S.
Enforcers, USA Today, November 8, 2002, at 1A.
24. PQ corporation improperly discharged wastewater into public sewers and
surface waters and was ordered to pay a total of $557,000 in fines and restitution
to the areas affected and will also pay $50,000 to fund community service
projects. Also, Keystone Insulator-Cleaner, Inc. and its owner were indicted on
one charge of conspiring to violate the Clean Water Act and two charges of
violating the Clean Water Act by dumping wastes into wetlands located on
McNally’s property. Environmental Protection Agency Enforcement Wrap-Up,
U.S. Newswire, May 25, 2004.
25. Carolyn Nielsen, Issues Remain in Pipeline Case, The Bellingham Herald
(Bellingham, WA), December 22, 2002, at 5B.
26. Christopher Bowe, Pfizer to Pay $430 Million for Drug Fraud, Finacial
Times (London), May 14, 2004, at 20. This amount is the second largest criminal
fine ever levied for healthcare fraud prosecution. Of the total, $240 million was
assessed as a criminal fine and $190 million was assessed as a civil fine. Also, the
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no more effective than a placebo in treating other
British pharmaceutical manufacturer
disorders.27
AstraZeneca paid a total of $355 million, including a
criminal fine of $64 million, to settle accusations of fraud
against Medicare concerning a prostate cancer drug.28
Bayer has paid $271 million and GlaxoSmithKline has paid
more than $86 million to settle allegations that they
relabeled drugs to mislead Medicaid officials.29 Abbott
Laboratories paid more than $622 million to settle an
investigation into its marketing practices.30
Finally,
Schering-Plough Corporation is under investigation of its
marketing practices as well as allegations that employees
destroyed documents related to the case.31
At least one U.S. corporation has an extensive record
of violations causing injuries and deaths. McWane, Inc., a
privately held company with approximately 5,000
employees, is one of the world’s largest manufacturers of
cast-iron sewer and water pipe.32 Since 1995, at least 4,600
injuries have been recorded in McWane foundries,33
fines were for activities conducted by Warner-Lambert before that company was
purchased by Pfizer in 2000.
27. Gardiner Harris, Pfizer to Pay $430 Million over Promoting Drug to
Doctors, N.Y. Times, May 14, 2004, at C1. Nearly 90 percent of the drug’s sales
continue to be for ailments for which the drug is not an approved treatment. The
company also illegally promoted the drug as treatment for Lou Gehrig’s disease,
attention deficit disorder, restless leg syndrome, and drug and alcohol withdrawal
seizures.
28. Melody Petersen, AstraZeneca Pleads Guilty in Cancer Medicine Scheme,
N.Y. Times, Saturday, June 21, 2003, at C1.
29. Two More States in AWP Fray; One Seeks Damages Related to Old
Federal Cases, Pharmaceutical Corporate Compliance Report, March 16, 2004, at
Vol. 2, No. 6.
30. Gardiner Harris, Abbott to Pay $622 Million to End Inquiry into
Marketing, N.Y. Times, June 27, 2003, at C1.
31. Melody Petersen, Indictment Seen By Drug Maker Over Marketing, N.Y.
Times Online, May 31, 2003, at A1 (late edition). If any company is convicted of a
felony involving health care fraud, the government could seek to bar its
prescription drugs from the federal Medicare and Medicaid programs.
32. David Barstow, & Lowell Bergman, Criminal Inquiry Under Way at Large
Pipe Manufacturer, N.Y. Times, May 15, 2003, at A1.
33. David Barstow & Lowell Bergman, At a Texas Foundry, an Indifference to
Life, N.Y. Times, January 8, 2003, at A1. At one plant in Texas, a report issued
by the federal Occupational Safety and Health Administration stated, “Workers
are covered with black residue from the foundry sand. Many work areas are
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McWane has been cited for
including ten deaths.34
hundreds of safety and environmental violations stemming
from management’s cost cutting efforts.35 It has been
convicted in the state courts of New York and Texas, has
deliberately ignored and willfully violated OSHA safety
rules, and now faces additional charges of health and safety
violations.36
As of May 2003, McWane had paid
approximately $10 million in fines.37
The prevalence of serious corporate malfeasance
highlights the importance of legal regimes that respond
to—and may prevent or deter—corporate wrongdoing.
Western Europeans nations use a variety of administrative,
civil, and criminal laws to address corporate misconduct.
In this article, we focus on corporate criminal liability
without meaning to underplay the importance of other
mechanisms. Section I describes the academic criticisms
and defenses of corporate criminal liability in the American
legal literature. Section II reviews the development of
corporate criminal liability in Western Europe. Section III
considers the nature of the developments noted in Western
Europe, and explores their implications for the United
States.
Although there has been much discussion
regarding the Sarbanes-Oxley Act’s impact in the United
States and even in Europe, it is not the subject of our
review, because expanded criminal liability under
Sarbanes-Oxley is targeted primarily at corporate officers
and directors rather than at the corporate entity itself.38 In
dark, due to poor lighting and clouds of sand. Despite all the ignition and fuel
sources, exit paths are not obvious.”
34. Robin Stein, Worker is Crushed to Death at Troubled Foundry Upstate,
N.Y. Times, February 21, 2004, B5.
35. Barstow & Bergman, supra note 33, at A1.
36. David Barstow & Lowell Bergman, Deaths on the Job, Slaps on the Wrist,
N.Y. Times, January 10, 2003, at A1. The company has also been indicted in New
Jersey and Alabama for environmental crimes. Andrew Dunn, McWane Accused
of Pollution, Deseret Morning News (Salt Lake City), May 27, 2004, at E3.
37. Barstow & Bergman, supra, note 33, at A1.
38. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 1348-1350; U.S. Sentencing Commission Supplement to
the 2002 Guidelines Manual §2B1.1 (2003). It should be noted, however, that in
response to Sarbanes-Oxley, which directed the Sentencing Commission to reexamine the guidelines governing corporate offenders, the Sentencing
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this article, we focus on justifications for imposing criminal
liability on the corporate entity as opposed to its officers
and directors. We do not address here the question, posed
by some law and economics scholars, of whether economic
offenses should be criminalized in the first place.
I. CONTEMPORARY ATTITUDES TOWARD CORPORATE
CRIMINAL LIABILITY IN THE UNITED STATES
Corporate criminal liability has become controversial
in the United States. Several different critiques have been
offered. Some critics begin from a retributive view of the
function of criminal law, others from a utilitarian
perspective.
Most of the utilitarian analysis focuses
directly on the efficiency of using criminal sanctions on the
corporate entity, though a closely related strand connects
these arguments to public choice theory. Although the
critics do not agree on first principles, they concur in the
conclusion that corporations should be sanctioned
(exclusively or in all but exceptional cases) in civil rather
than criminal proceedings.
Other scholars defend
corporate criminal liability, some on the ground of the
expressive function or social meaning that attaches to
criminal law, and others on more pragmatic grounds such
as the resources available for the enforcement of criminal
law.
A. The Retributive Critique of Corporate Criminal Liability
One line of criticism asserts that the traditional forms
and functions of criminal law should not be applied to
juridical persons, because they cannot in any meaningful
sense be said to have mens rea or to be “guilty” of a

Commission amended the guidelines, effective November 1, 2004, to impose
stricter criteria for corporate compliance programs. See Amendments to the
Sentencing Guidelines, supra note 2. These amendments are relevant to our
comparative review of sanctions imposed on corporate offenders. See infra note
300 and accompanying text.
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Imposing criminal liability on a
criminal offense.39
corporate entity requires resort to the principles of
respondeat superior, rather than individual responsibility,
which is the hallmark of the criminal law. Accordingly,
using the criminal justice system to convict or punish a
corporation is undesirable because it obscures the moral
content of criminal liability.40 This critique is consistent
with a retributivist or desert-based view of the function of
criminal law, which imposes punishment on the basis of
the offender’s moral blameworthiness, in order to respond
to the wrong manifest in the criminal conduct.41
B. The Law and Economics Efficiency Critique
Another line of criticism of corporate criminal liability
is founded on a law and economics perspective and a
utilitarian view of the function of criminal law. Assuming
for our purposes the efficacy of using the criminal law in
some instances to regulate economic conduct—an

39. Daniel R. Fischel & Alan O. Sykes, Corporate Crime, 25 J. Legal Stud.
319, 320 (1996) (“Corporations are legal fictions, and legal fictions cannot commit
criminal acts. Nor can they possess mens rea, a guilty state of mind.”); Paul H.
Robinson, The Criminal-Civil Distinction and the Utility of Desert, 76 B.U. L.
Rev. 201, 211 n.40 (1996). See also V.S. Khanna, Is the Notion of Corporate Fault
a Faulty Notion?: The Case of Corporate Mens Rea, 79 B.U. L. Rev. 355, 356
(1999) (advocating corporate criminal liability based upon negligence or strict
liability because of the incoherence of the concept of corporate mens rea).
40. John Baker, Corporations Aren’t Criminals, Wall St. Journal, April 22,
2002, at A3 (corporate criminal liability “ignores the moral basis on which
substantive criminal law rests—the requirement that a defendant be personally
responsible for his actions”); Paul H. Robinson, The Practice of Restorative
Justice: The Virtues of Restorative Process, the Vices of “Restorative Justice,”
2003 Utah L. Rev. 375, 384-85 (extending criminal liability to corporations “risks
obscuring the moral content of criminal liability”). David Skeel and William
Stuntz have cautioned that if criminal law is expanded to cover more technical
violations, trials—which by their nature tend to focus on behavior on the outer
edge of criminal liability, rather than the core—will increasingly deal with
technicalities and trivialize the criminal law. David Skeel & William Stuntz,
Another Attempt to Legislate Corporate Honesty, N.Y. Times, July 10, 2002, at
A21.
41. Cf. Robinson, supra note 39, at 210-11 (using a retributive-desert model to
analyze the expansion of criminal sanctions to cover behavior traditionally the
subject of civil law).
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assumption obviously not accepted by all law and
economics scholars—the law and economics critique focuses
on whether criminal sanctions are the most efficient
response to corporate misconduct. Law and economics
scholars believe that civil entity liability is a more efficient
response, or that individual liability (either civil or
criminal) is preferable to entity liability.
In general, law and economics scholars have agreed
that criminal sanctions are not an efficient response to
corporate misconduct, though they have reached that
conclusion based upon different—and in some cases
inconsistent—reasoning. One line of critique sees criminal
sanctions as too powerful. Because criminal sanctions are
so potent, they tend to overdeter, inducing enterprises to
spend more resources on monitoring and compliance than
is socially useful.42
According to this account, civil
sanctions can be more precisely calibrated, and hence more
efficient at matching the costs of compliance with the
expected social benefit.43 (Additionally, if sanctions are
large enough to be meaningful, they will tend to have a
spillover effect, injuring relatively blameless shareholders
and employees.44)
Law and economics theorists have also focused on two
distinctive attributes of criminal liability: procedural
requirements and the reputational effects of conviction. Law
and economic analysis treats the heightened procedural
requirements in criminal proceedings (such as proof beyond
a reasonable doubt, trial by jury, and double jeopardy) as
increased transaction costs. Since a corporation cannot be
imprisoned, both civil and criminal proceedings generally
42. Fischel & Sykes, supra note 39, at 321. See also Bruce H. Kobayashi,
Antitrust, Agency, and Amnesty: An Economic Analysis of the Criminal
Enforcement of the Antitrust Laws Against Corporations, 69 Geo. Wash. L. Rev.
715, 744 (2001) (concluding that increased enforcement of antitrust laws under
the Clinton Administration probably caused corporations to take too many
precautions ex ante and thus made the system less efficient).
43. Fischel & Sykes, supra note 39, at 321.
44. John C. Coffee, Jr., “No Soul to Damn: No Body to Kick”: An
Unscandalized Inquiry into the Problem of Corporate Punishment, 79 Mich. L.
Rev. 386, 386-87 & n.4 (1981).
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result in monetary penalties, and law and economic scholars
question whether the increased transaction costs of the
criminal process can be justified.45 Criminal conviction also
imposes a stigma or reputational penalty.46 Law and
economics scholars have expressed a variety of concerns
regarding the reputational damage that criminal charges
and criminal convictions can impose upon corporations.47 On
the one hand, there is concern that a corporation may suffer
unjustified reputational harm if it is convicted of a relatively
minor criminal charge.48 On the other hand, in the case of
the most serious offenses, reputational harm may be
warranted, but in such cases the nature of the facts may
speak for themselves, creating a public outcry, to which
criminal charges add little or nothing.49 By this reasoning,
reputational harm is either unnecessary or excessive.
Indeed, reputational sanctions may have a perverse quality.
They are most effective when applied to firms with good
reputations, and they are ineffective if a firm has not yet
created, or has already lost, its positive reputation.50 Thus
firms whose general conduct has been exemplary will suffer
the greatest reputational damage from criminal charges,
and bad corporate actors will be immune from reputational
45. V.S. Khanna, Corporate Criminal Liability: What Purpose Does It Serve?,
109 Harv. L. Rev. 1477, 1512-20 (1996) (noting, however, that where sanctions
are high and legal standards uncertain, the greater procedural protections
afforded by the criminal process may be warranted).
46. Although the scholarship generally treats the existence of this
reputational effect as a given, there has been surprisingly little effort to establish
its existence empirically. One study found no effect on share prices of news
reports of civil charges and settlements of fraud charges compared with reports of
malum prohibitum criminal charges. See Michael K. Block, Optimal Penalties,
Criminal Law and the Control of Corporate Behavior, 71 B.U. L. Rev. 395, 413-15
(1991).
47. The literature also contains an interesting discussion of the impact of the
“rub off” effect of reputational penalties on corporate officers, managers, and
other employees. V.S. Khanna has defined a set of criteria that define the
circumstances under which such rub off penalties are warranted and effective.
Khanna, supra note 45, at 1509-12. See also Fischel & Sykes, supra note 39, at
342 (discussing rub off penalties in the context of Michael Milken and Drexel
Burnham Lambert).
48. Fischel & Sykes, supra note 39, at 332.
49. Khanna, supra note 45, at 1509.
50. Id. at 1500.
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sanctions. Moreover, the reputational loss to a firm that has
been convicted of criminal conduct, unlike a civil judgment
awarding monetary damages, does not provide a reciprocal
gain to any injured party.51 It is thus far less efficient than a
sanction that provides such a benefit.52 It should be noted,
however, that from an efficiency perspective, the
reputational effects of criminal charges do provide two
related benefits to the prosecution. Reputational effects
ensue immediately when charges are filed, and accordingly
they impose pressure on firms (as well as individuals) to
engage in rapid plea discussions to limit the reputational
damage.53 Of course these benefits to the prosecution may
be deemed undesirable from a broader social vantage point,
since they impose a penalty with few procedural protections,
and may create undue pressure on a corporation to plead
guilty even to unfounded charges in order to reduce the
impact of the negative publicity that occurs throughout
criminal proceedings.
C. The Public Choice Critique
In contrast to the traditional law and economics
analysis—which assumes criminal sanctions are unduly
severe, inflicting unjustified, excessive, and sometimes
perverse costs on corporations and their officers,
shareholders, and employees—a more recent critique has
suggested that imposing criminal sanctions on a corporation
is actually the least costly penalty from the firm’s point of
view, raising the concern that criminal liability may
underdeter corporate misconduct.54 This new argument is
51. Id. at 1503, 1505.
52. Law and economics scholars have made a similar argument in favor of
using criminal fines rather than imprisonment whenever possible, because fines
return resources to the public (and allow the defendant to remain self supporting
and productive), but imprisonment imposes substantial costs. See, e.g., Richard
A. Posner, Optimal Sentences for White-Collar Criminals, 17 Am. Crim. L. Rev.
409, 409-11 (1980); Joel Waldfogel, Are Fines and Prison Terms Used Efficiently?
Evidence on Federal Fraud Offenders, 38 J.L. & Econ. 107, 107 (1995).
53. Khanna, supra note 45, at 1505-08.
54. V.S. Khanna, Corporate Crime Legislation: A Political Economy
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based on public choice theory and its recognition of the
important role interest groups play in the legislative
process,55 and on the observation that in several instances
corporate interests have opposed the expansion of corporate
criminal liability less vigorously than enhanced civil liability
for corporate entities or criminal liability for corporate
officers and agents.56 Given the political power wielded by
corporate interests, their relatively muted opposition to
corporate criminal liability suggests that they view criminal
penalties as less problematic than other sanctions.
In addition, the public choice analysis incorporates
many of the arguments described above regarding the
relative inefficiency of criminal sanctions, but instead of
concluding that criminal sanctions overdeter corporate
economic activity, it concludes that they may underdeter
corporate misconduct. As compared with enforcement
through private civil actions, criminal enforcement has
typically been thin,57 and criminal fines often less than civil
penalties.58 Moreover, since only the government can
enforce criminal laws, corporate interests can later lobby
below the political radar to limit enforcement by limiting
the enforcement budget.59 Finally, in criminal proceedings
the government must meet additional procedural and
substantive hurdles.
For these and other reasons,
corporate interests may see the creation or expansion of
corporate criminal liability as the lesser evil at times when

Analysis, Discussion Paper No. 03-012, University of Michigan John N. Ohlin
Center
for
Law
and
Economics
(2003),
available
at
http://www.law.umich.edu/CentersAndPrograms/olin/papers.htm#2003 at 3, 46.
For a general application of public choice theory to criminal legislation, see
William J. Stuntz, The Pathological Politics of Criminal Law, 100 Mich. L. Rev.
505 (2001).
55. For a general discussion of interest groups and public choice theory, see
Daniel A. Farber & Philip P. Frickey, Law and Public Choice: A Critical
Introduction 12-37 (1991).
56. Khanna, supra note 54, at 21-23 (discussing the Private Securities
Litigation Reform Act of 1995, the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, and SarbanesOxley).
57. Id. at 12-13.
58. Id. at 13-14.
59. Id. at 8 n.40, 17-18.
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the pubic demands legislative action to respond to
According to this analysis,
corporate wrongdoing.60
corporate interests will more strenuously oppose more
effective legislation creating civil liability for corporations,
or criminal liability for corporate officers, directors, and
management, and corporate criminal liability may be
enacted as a substitute for more effective laws. Thus the
enactment of corporate criminal liability may actually have
the perverse effect of underdeterring corporate misconduct.
D. Defenses of Corporate Criminal Liability
Despite the range of criticisms, corporate criminal
liability also has its American defenders. Since heightened
procedural protections plainly do impose some additional
procedural costs, many advocates of employing criminal
liability base their arguments on the distinctive functions of
criminal law. Some scholarly defenses of criminal liability
for corporations focus on the expressive function of criminal
law, and reason that criminal sanctions are necessary to
respond to corporate wrongdoing that denigrates the value
of the persons and interests injured by corporate
Similarly, a social meaning analysis
wrongdoing.61
emphasizes that criminal law expresses society’s
condemnation of prohibited activities.62 Replacing corporate
criminal liability with civil liability conveys the message
that the right to engage in prohibited activities can be
purchased; only corporate criminal liability can provide both
the incentives necessary to prevent crime and a vehicle for
60. See id. at 19 (arguing that corporate interests would prefer criminal
liability, with its heightened procedures, over civil liability); see id. at 21-22
(noting successful passage of Sarbanes-Oxley after major corporate accounting
scandals but unsuccessful attempt post-Enron to repeal recent limitations on
private securities actions).
61. Lawrence Friedman, In Defense of Corporate Criminal Liability, 23 Harv.
J.L. & Pub. Pol’y 833, 858 (2000). But see Vikramaditya S. Khanna, Should the
Behavior of Top Management Matter?, 91 Geo. L.J. 1215, 1218 (2003) (suggesting
that expressive considerations can be furthered by other, less socially costly,
forms of liability).
62. Dan M. Kahan, Social Meaning and the Economic Analysis of Crime, 27 J.
Legal Stud. 609, 617 (1998).
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the message that certain activities are prohibited and
variances cannot be purchased.63
Using the criminal justice system to respond to
corporate misconduct also has pragmatic advantages.
There is no comprehensive civil counterpart to the
extensive network of federal and state prosecutors and
investigators who make up the “great infrastructure of
criminal law enforcers.”64 If corporations cannot be held
liable for criminal conduct, this infrastructure will be
unavailable to investigate corporate wrongdoing, and there
may not be adequate resources for administrative and civil
enforcement.65 There are also some procedural advantages.
Although criminal procedure provides defendants with
heightened procedural rights, it also provides a significant
advantage to the government, particularly the power of
investigative grand juries.66 Additionally, the greater speed
with which criminal charges are generally resolved67 means
that they can bring speedier restitution to victims.68
Corporate criminal liability can also provide a basis for
desirable sanctions other than monetary fines, such as
equity fines and corporate probation.69
To provide a new lens through which to illuminate the
debate about the legitimacy of corporate criminal liability
in American law, we turn now to the recent developments
in Europe.

63. Id. at 619.
64. Coffee, supra note 44, at 447.
65. Id. at 447-48.
66. For a general introduction to the grand jury, see Sara Sun Beale et al.,
Grand Jury Law and Practice (2d ed. 1997).
67. Criminal cases receive priority because of the constitutional and statutory
guarantees of the right to a speedy trial. See Sara Sun Beale, Federalizing
Crime: Assessing the Impact on the Federal Courts, 543 Annals Am. Acad. Pol. &
Soc. Sci. 39, 46-48, 50 (1996) (noting that increases in the criminal caseload
required federal courts to give priority to criminal trials to avoid speedy trial
dismissals; this forced more civil cases off the trial docket and into alternative
dispute resolution).
68. Coffee, supra note 44, at 447.
69. Id. at 448-59.
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II. THE DEVELOPMENTS IN WESTERN EUROPE
While the preceding philosophical and policy debate
has been occurring in the United States, a debate of a
different kind has been occurring in Western European
countries. Other than Great Britain (which, by the 1950s,
had adopted a more limited form of the respondeat superior
theory of American corporate criminal liability70), Western
European legal systems fundamentally resisted the
imposition of criminal liability on legal entities throughout
most of the last century.71 This opposition was expressed in
the principle societas delinquere non potest, that is, a legal
entity cannot be blameworthy.72
In this section we describe a fundamental shift in the
European approach, and the widespread (though not
uniform) adoption of corporate criminal liability. In part A
of this section, we will briefly describe some of the events
that drew attention to the issue of corporate criminal
liability in Western Europe. Then, in part B, we will
highlight some of the recent legislative developments
imposing corporate criminal liability in the Netherlands,
Denmark, Finland, and Switzerland. In parts C and D, we
will discuss developments and continued debate in France
and Germany, respectively, since they are two of the most

70. John C. Coffee, Corporate Criminal Liability: An Introduction and
Comparative Survey, in Criminal Responsibility of Legal and Collective Entities,
9, 11-12, 14 (Albin Eser et al. eds., 1999); L.H. Leigh, The Criminal Liability of
Corporations and Other Groups: A Comparative View, 80 Mich. L. Rev. 1508,
1510-11 (1981).
71. The exception was Denmark, which has recognized corporate criminal
liability for certain offenses since 1926. See Coffee, supra note 70, at 24. In 1996,
a statutory framework for corporate criminal liability was included in the Danish
criminal code.
Gorm Toftegaard Nielsen, Criminal Liability of Collective
Entities—the Danish Model, in Criminal Responsibility of Legal and Collective
Entities, supra note 70, at 189, 190.
72. See Günter Heine, New Developments in Corporate Criminal Law
Liability in Europe: Can Europeans Learn from the American Experience—Or
Vice Versa?, 1998 St. Louis-Warsaw Transatlantic L.J. 173, 174 (1998); Leigh,
supra note 70, at 1509; Mireille Delmas-Marty, Les Conditions de fond de mise en
jeu de la responsibilité pénale, 111 Revue des Sociétés (Dalloz, April-June 1993)
at 301.
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significant civil law systems in Western Europe.73 In
addition, we will focus in more depth on the new French
law imposing corporate criminal liability for another
reason: as best we can determine, France’s new law is more
comprehensive than other statutory schemes, particularly
in its provision of extensive non-monetary sanctions.
Although we have not canvassed all other developments in
Western European countries, we note that Belgium,
Norway, and Portugal have also introduced varying
degrees of corporate criminal liability.74 Spain and Italy,
however, continue to resist imposing full corporate criminal
liability, but like Germany, they have imposed quasicriminal administrative liability.75

73. “Traditionally, France has been considered ‘the motherland of modern
codification, and the Napoleonic Code Pénal is the most widely followed penal
code in the world.’” Leonard Orland & Charles Cachera, Corporate Crime and
Punishment in France: Criminal Responsibility of Legal Entities (Personnes
Morales) Under the New French Criminal Code (Nouveau Code Pénal), 11 Conn.
J. Int’l L. 111, 113 (1995) (quoting Gerhard O.W. Mueller, Foreward to 1 The
French Penal Code xiii (Gerhard O.W. Mueller ed., Jean F. Moreau & Gerhard
O.W. Mueller trans., 1960)). German criminal law theory has “widespread
influence in the civil law world,” affecting many European countries, as well as
Latin American and Asian nations. Markus Dirk Dubber, The Promise of
German Criminal Law at 1 (unpublished manuscript on file with author, Feb. 22,
2004).
74. Portugal imposed vicarious agency liability in the areas of economic and
environmental crimes. Coffee, supra note 70, at 24. Norway established
corporate criminal liability for certain offenses, but there is very little English
commentary on Norwegian developments. Heine, supra note 72, at 175; Manfred
Möhrenschlager, National and International Developments, in Criminal
Responsibility of Legal and Collective Entities, supra note 70, at 89, 91. Finally,
on May 4, 1999, the Belgium parliament surprised some observers by adopting
criminal liability for corporations. Under the new law, according to one observer,
“the legal entity is considered criminally liable for crimes which are connected to
the purpose of the legal entity or which have been committed in its interest or for
its account.” Michael G. Faure, Criminal Responsibilities of Legal and Collective
Entities: Developments in Belgium, in Criminal Responsibility of Legal and
Collective Entities, supra note 70, at 105, 111. In contrast to the French law and
other proposals discussed later in this section that preserve individual criminal
liability, the Belgian law, according to Faure, “excludes the liability of the
individual person, unless the latter knowingly committed a fault,” when the
corporation is liable. Id.
75. In Italy and Spain, legislatures increasingly imposed quasi-criminal
administrative sanctions on corporations to “confront the growing power of
economic enterprises.” See Heine, supra note 72, at 174; C.E. Paliero, Criminal
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Finally, in part E, we will highlight some proposals of
two transnational European organizations, the Council of
Europe and the European Union. Although member states
have not embraced wholeheartedly the proposals for
criminalizing certain corporate conduct in social and
economic fields, those proposals are still significant. As
reflections of the views of representatives of member state
governments, these proposals may signal the direction of
future policy in the member states and influence legislative
initiatives in those states.
A. Western European Scholars Confront the Need for
Corporate Criminal Liability
By the late 1970s, legal scholars and commentators in
Western Europe were increasingly challenging the viability
of the principle of societas delinquere non potest, believing
that the subject of the criminal responsibility of
corporations could not be avoided.76 This was driven,
Liability of Corporations—Italy, in Criminal Liability of Corporations, XIVth
International Congress of Comparative Law 251, 265 (Hans de Doelder & Klaus
Tiedemann eds., 1996 Kluwer Law International) (noting that since 1981, “the
principles behind and the structure of administrative torts have been closely
connected to the criminal model which is today so well known in Europe, the
modern prototype of which is to be found in the German Ordnungswidrigkeiten”).
In Italy, movement toward corporate criminal liability faces a fundamental
obstacle, namely, the constitutional prescription that “criminal liability is
personal.” Id. at 253 (citing art. 27, ¶ 1, of the Italian Constitution). A strict
reading of this clause to require individual culpability was re-affirmed in 1988 by
Italy’s Constitutional Court. Id. at 255, 258-59. Nevertheless, as Paliero notes,
this decision has not deterred scholars from continuing to explore possible models
for corporate liability, especially since there is a wide consensus that the “more
invasive activities of companies and corporations” cannot be controlled without
punitive sanctions. Id. at 261, 259-71. Paliero further argues that corporations
have “interests which are distinct from those of physical persons,” and therefore
are capable of committing criminal offenses. Id. at 257. Another Italian scholar
has also argued for the development of corporate criminal liability: “The classical
construction of criminal offences based on a human scale is increasingly unable to
deal with the emergence of new, collective or complex entities, the latter of which
prevail ever more in the most characteristic sectors of modern crime, for example,
organized and economic crime.” Vincenzo Militello, The Basis for Criminal
Responsibility of Collective Entities in Italy, in Criminal Responsibility of Legal
and Collective Entities, supra note 70, at 181, 181.
76. Klaus Tiedemann, Introductory Note, in Criminal Liability of
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primarily, by the increasing economic influence of
corporations in Western Europe77 and the unique threats
posed to society from unregulated corporate misconduct in
such areas as consumer markets and the environment.78
Corporate misconduct was viewed as a new form of
As a
“delinquency” worthy of criminal sanction.79
consequence, some commentators were willing to conceive
that the corporation itself had its own personality and was
capable
of
being
imprinted
with
criminal
80
blameworthiness,
even if the concept of inflicting
punishment on a corporation posed its own conundrum.81
In France, the largest of the civil law Western
European countries to have adopted comprehensive

Corporations, XIVth International Congress of Comparative Law, supra note 75,
at 1, 1 (noting academic conferences organized to address the “criminal liability of
enterprises,” including the 10th International Congress of Comparative Law in
Brussels in 1978, International Centre of sociological, criminal and penitentiary
research and studies in Messine in 1979, and the meeting of German, Austrian
and Swiss professors of criminal law in Basel in 1993).
77. Leigh, supra note 70, at 1508-09.
78. Klaus Tiedemann, Rapport général, in Criminal Liability of Corporations,
in Criminal Liability of Corporations, XIVth International Congress of
Comparative Law, supra note 75, at 11, 14. See Günter Heine, Criminal Liability
of Enterprises and New Risks: International Developments, National
Consequences, 2 Maastricht Journal of European and Comparative Law 107, 108
(1995) (noting that corporations in Western Europe do not face serious sanctions
for environmental harm caused by their conduct).
79. Tiedemann, supra note 78, at 14.
80. Id. at 25. Tiedemann notes that corporations were increasingly regarded
as creating a climate which encouraged the commission of offenses on behalf of
the corporation by its representatives. Id. at 14. Cf. Heine, supra note 78, at 107
(“The international trend is towards imposing criminal liability on the enterprise,
increasingly independent of proof of misconduct by a particular individual.”).
81. See Tiedemann, supra note 78, at 15-18 (discussing the effectiveness of
monetary and non-monetary sanctions in both the civil and criminal context in
Western Europe); Heine, supra note 78, at 110 (“. . . a continuing lessening of the
parameters of criminal responsibility would lead to a liability which is no longer
of great consequence to anyone. . . . Even exclusively deterrent considerations
face special difficulties when it is a question of determining guilt and imposing
criminal sanctions in connection with entrepreneurial activity.”). Cf. Leigh, supra
note 70, at 1526 (“Scholars who advocate reform in Europe wish to have the
power not only to fine a corporation, but also to subject it to other measures, for
example, closure of premises, disqualification from pursuing a professional
activity, confiscation, and more original still, placing the corporation under
judicial supervision. Dissolution has also been envisaged.”) (footnotes omitted).
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corporate criminal liability to date,82 there was an
increasing sense that economically powerful entities that
existed due to the state’s “patrimony” should also be
responsible to society for their conduct.83 Discussion about
the use of criminal and administrative sanctions to
regulate corporate conduct continued among legislative
reformers and legal commentators in France throughout
the 1980s.84 During this period, the French confronted the
consequences of unregulated corporate activities, including
the growth in the power of multinational corporations and
their ability to evade local regulatory requirements,85
notorious corporate fault, such as the case involving the
sale of blood tainted with the HIV virus by national
agencies responsible for the collection and distribution of
82. On July 22,1992, the French legislature passed the Nouveau Code Pénal,
which constituted a comprehensive revision of the French criminal code. One of
the innovations in the new penal code were provisions imposing corporate
criminal liability, which became effective on March 1, 1994. Bernard Bouloc, La
Criminalisation du Comportement Collectif–France, in Criminal Liability of
Corporations, XIVth International Congress of Comparative Law, supra note 75,
at 235, 237.
83. Id. at 236-37.
84. Orland & Cachera, supra note 73, at 121-22 (noting 1978 and 1986
attempts to pass legislation in France on corporate liability before passage in
1992 of the new penal code).
By the 1980s, French law imposed quasi-criminal liability on corporations
for offenses concerning tax fraud, foreign exchange offenses, price-fixing, and, in
narrow circumstances, worker safety. See Leigh, supra note 70, at 1520. This
liability appears to be administrative in nature, although Leigh characterizes it
as criminal. We are not aware of any French commentator who has suggested
that formal corporate criminal liability existed before the adoption of the 1992
new French penal code. Moreover, Leigh’s piece notes that while the French
government imposed “criminal responsibility” on corporations operating as cartels
or abusing dominant market positions by the early 1980s, French academics
argued that the French government “limited itself to administrative sanctions,”
and was reluctant “to cross the Rubicon and impose full corporate criminal
liability.” Id. This would tend to confirm our understanding that other instances
of what Leigh refers to as “criminal” liability imposed on corporations before 1992
were really administrative in nature. France adopted a comprehensive liability
scheme in 1992, which will be discussed further below.
See infra text
accompanying notes 115-40.
85. See generally Mireille Delmas-Marty & Klaus Tiedemann, La Criminalité,
Le Droit Pénal et Les Multinationales, 1979 Juris-Classeur Periodique, la
Semaine Juridique, (J.C.P.) II no. 53, at I 2935 (discussing role of criminal law in
relation to conduct of multi-national corporations).
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blood in France,86 and unfair trade practices injuring
consumers.87 Opponents of corporate criminal liability,
however, in addition to their doctrinal resistance, argued
that heavy administrative fines were sufficient to address
corporate misconduct, and that imposing criminal liability
would only harm a corporation’s shareholders, employees,
and creditors.88
B. Breaking Free from Traditional Doctrinal Restraints
The modern trend in Western Europe of imposing
criminal responsibility on corporations began in 1970 and
continues to the present time. In this section, we will
briefly review developments in some European countries
before focusing in more depth on developments in France
and Germany.
1. The Netherlands
In 1976, the Netherlands became one of the first
Western European countries to adopt legislation enacting
comprehensive corporate criminal liability. The legislation
made corporations liable for all offenses, expanding on
criminal liability that had previously been limited to
economic crimes.89 The 1976 legislation also dispensed
with the requirement that liability be predicated on the
actions of natural persons acting on the corporation’s
behalf, which was a requirement of the previous 1951 law.90
Liability may be predicated on deficient decision-making
86. Orland & Cachera, supra note 73, at n. 52 and accompanying text.
87. See Bouloc, supra note 82, at 237.
88. Orland & Cachera, supra note 73, at 122.
89. Hans de Doelder, Criminal Liability of Corporations—Netherlands, in
Criminal Liability of Corporations, XIVth International Congress of Comparative
Law, supra note 75, at 289, 291-92. This legislation is codified in paragraph 51 of
the Dutch Penal Code. Id. Doelder notes that the difference between the use of
criminal and administrative procedures is that in the case of the former, “the
government aims at prevention, retaliation and intentional infliction of grief; the
adminstrative intervention aims at reparation with less moral intention.” Id. at
294.
90. Doelder, supra note 89, at 291-92.
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structures within the corporation or on the aggregate
knowledge of multiple individuals.91 Dutch courts appear
to have formulated negligence-style standards in assessing
corporate liability.92 At the same time, it appears that
respondeat superior liability has been preserved under
Dutch law.93 Dutch prosecutors now have the ability to
prosecute either or both the corporation and persons
actually responsible for the offense.94
2. Denmark
In 1926, with the passage of the Butter Act, Denmark
introduced corporate criminal liability for some offenses.95
By the end of the century, Denmark had greatly expanded
the list of enterprise offenses.96 Recently, in 2002, the
Danish criminal code was amended to provide that legal
persons may be liable for all offenses within the general
criminal code.97 However, offenses under other specialized
laws, such as the Companies Act or the Act of Chartered
Accountants, must specifically state whether they are
applicable to legal entities.98
91. Coffee, supra note 70, at 21-22. It has been said that the Netherlands has
established “functional liability (functioneel daderschap)” in the area of socioeconomic legislation, in which courts look to whether the corporation’s
management “had the power to decide whether those acts [the offense] took place
or not, and the acts were parts of acts the occurrence of which according to the
regular course of events was commonly accepted or commonly is accepted by the
corporation.” J.A.W. Lensing, The Netherlands, in 3 International Encyclopedia
of Laws, Criminal Law ¶ 187 (1997 Kluwer Law International).
92. Coffee, supra note 70, at 22.
93. Id. at 21-22. Lensing states that respondeat superior liability does not
exist under Dutch law; however, his conclusion appears to be based on a highly
formalistic distinction in theory. Lensing, supra note 91, ¶ 174. In fact, under
the functional liability approach described by Lensing, respondeat superior
liability may apply, at least where management was aware of and permitted the
offense to occur.
94. Doelder, supra note 89, at 305. Doelder notes that in some cases, a
prosecutor may wish to impose liability on a natural person rather than on the
corporate entity. Id.
95. Nielsen, supra note 71, at 189, 190.
96. Id.
97. Section 306 of the Danish Criminal Code (DJØF Publishing, 2d ed. 2003).
98. Lars Bo Langsted et al., Denmark, 2 International Encyclopedia of Laws,
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The Danish criminal code was previously amended in
1996 to impose a uniform standard of criminal liability on
various forms of legal entities.99 That provision remains in
effect today. The new provision also established the
following broad standard for liability: “Criminal liability of
a legal person is conditional upon a transgression having
been committed within the establishment of this person by
one or more persons connected to this legal person or by the
legal person himself.”100 This provision appears to create
two possibilities for liability: “either that a specific natural
person has acted with the necessary mens rea in fulfilling
the actus reus or that the legal person as such could and
should have avoided the crime in question.”101 The first test
is simple respondeat superior liability, and liability extends
to acts “in the interests of the company” of all corporate
officers and employees.102 Liability under the second test
does not require identifying the exact individual who
That does not mean,
performed the criminal act.103
however, that corporations may be strictly liable for
A
offenses (unless the legislature so provides).104
corporation must be shown to have acted negligently or
willfully, depending on the mens rea element of the specific
offense.105

Criminal Law (2003 Kluwer Law International), at ¶81; comments of Professor
Thomas Elholm, Assistant Professor, Department of Law, University of Southern
Denmark, in correspondence of July 2, 2004 and July 7, 2004, with the authors
(correspondence on file with the authors).
99. Nielsen, supra note 71, at 190.
100. Section 27(1) of the 1996 Danish Criminal Code, quoted in Langsted et al.,
supra note 98, ¶ 82.
101. Langsted et al., supra note 98, ¶ 82.
102. Nielsen, supra note 71, at 193.
103. Langsted et al., supra note 98, ¶ 84.
104. Id. ¶¶ 83-84 (noting that the necessary acts or omissions must have been
made by a person on behalf of the corporation); Nielsen, supra note 71, at 192
(“The law is now clear: a company can only be penalized if the violation was
willful or negligent.”).
105. Nielsen, supra note 71, at 190, 192. There is limited literature in English
on Danish and Norwegian law. From the comments of Gorm Toftegaard Nielsen,
the Danish 1996 statute simply appears to be an enabling statute, directing the
court to look at the specific offense for mens rea requirements.
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3. Finland
After years of debate on the subject, in 1995 Finland
passed legislation imposing criminal liability on
corporations.106 The new provision establishes a form of
negligence-based liability, in which a corporation can be
held liable (1) for the conduct of management, employees,
or representatives, acting on behalf of the corporation, or
(2) in the absence of an identifiable wrongdoer, if “the care
and diligence necessary for the prevention of the offense
has not been observed” by the corporation.107
4. Switzerland
In late 2003, Switzerland imposed criminal liability on
corporations, having previously rejected such liability for
doctrinal reasons.108 Swiss criminal liability is based on the
concept of “subsidiary liability”: a corporation can be held
liable for offenses committed on its behalf only if fault
106. The new provision is contained in Chapter 9 of the revised Penal Code of
Finland (743/21 April 1995). “The idea of introducing corporate criminal liabilty
to the Finnish legal system was first introduced in . . . the 1970s” through several
legislative committees studying environmental offenses, labor offenses, and
freedom of the press. M. Riihijärvi, Criminal Liability of Corporations—Finland,
in Criminal Liability of Corporations, XIVth International Congress of
Comparative Law, supra note 75, at 203, 211.
107. 743/1995, §§ 2 and 3.
English version available online at
http://www.wings.buffalo.edu/law/bclc/finnish.htm.
The new provision also
prohibits a corporation from seeking indemnification for fines incurred from the
actual wrongdoer, unless there is a basis in corporations or “foundations” law.
743/1995 § 3.
108. Peter Muller, Petite histoire législative, in La punissabilité de l’entreprise,
L’Expert-Comptable Suisse, edition spéciale, no. 7, June-July 2003, 11. A limited
exception existed for offenses involving fiscal (tax) evasion. Id. Opposition to
corporate criminal liability also came from business quarters, who mounted stiff
opposition to a proposal in the late 1980s to impose administrative criminal
sanctions on corporations in the limited areas of organized crime and money
laundering. Id. But the issue was addressed again in the 1990s. Switzerland
was a member of several international conventions which required member states
to impose deterrent sanctions on corporations for various offenses in the fields of
environmental law and government corruption. Id. Although such sanctions
were not required to be penal in nature, those arguing for criminal law believed
that Swiss administrative measures could not fulfill the symbolic and deterrent
role of penal sanctions. Id. at 11-12.
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cannot be attributed to a specific individual “because of a
lack of organization within the enterprise.”109 The offense
must be “in furtherance of a business activity consistent
with the purpose of the enterprise,” a requirement which
undoubtedly will need to be defined by the courts.110
Criminal fines can range up to 5 million Swiss francs.111
In addition, a corporation may be held liable for certain
serious offenses independently of the criminal liability of an
individual, if the corporation has “failed to take all
reasonable and necessary measures to prevent such an
offense.”112 Those offenses are criminal organizational crime,
money laundering, bribery, corruption, and the financing of
terrorism.113 This provision appears to make a corporation
presumptively liable for such offenses unless it can show
that it has acted with reasonable diligence to prevent their
commission.
This type of liability is predicated on

109. Art. 100quater of the Swiss Criminal Code, ¶ 1, as quoted in Schellenberg
Wittmer, Criminal Liability of Legal Entities, 20 No. 4 Int’l Enforcement L. Rep.
133 (April 2004). This statute appears to create a somewhat schizophrenic
scheme of liability, in which a corporation may avoid liability for egregious and
willful conduct by an individual acting on its behalf when a responsible actor is
identified, but may be held criminally liable for unintended offenses because it
negligently failed to create an organizational structure in which such an
individual could be identified. Moreover, as noted by Wittmer, corporations may
be able to avoid liability simply by establishing a responsible person for “specific
professional functions” within the corporation. Wittmer, supra, § 3(b). Perhaps
in recognition of these potential escape valves for corporations, the Swiss
legislature identified a category of offenses as serious enough to merit criminal
liability of the corporation independent of the liability of an individual. See infra
text accompanying notes 112-14.
Prior to 2003, Swiss law criminalized the “breach of duties to supervise,
instruct and select employees.” Christopher Ringelmann, European Trends in
Environmental Criminal Legislation, 5 European J. Crime, Crim. L. & Just. 393,
398 (1997). In cases in which individual liability was difficult to prove, a
corporation could be subject to administrative sanctions. Id. at 400.
110. Art. 100quater of the Swiss Criminal Code, ¶ 1, as quoted in Wittmer,
supra note 109, § 2. For a further discussion of how this requirement may be
interpreted, see Robert Roth, Une responsabilité sans culpabilité, in La
punissabilité de l’entreprise, L’Expert-Comptable Suisse, edition spéciale, no. 7,
June-July 2003, at 17, 17-19.
111. Wittmer, supra note 109, § 2(e).
112. Art. 100quater of the Swiss Criminal Code, ¶ 2, as quoted in Wittmer,
supra note 109, § 2.
113. Id. § 2(b) (discussing ¶ 2 of art. 100quater of the Swiss Criminal Code).
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management’s failure to properly organize and manage the
corporations’s affairs.114
C. France Adopts Corporate Criminal Liability
Since the passage of the Napoleonic Code in 1810,
France had generally “repudiated the idea that
corporations, as legal fictions, could be criminally liable.”115
Thus, it was a significant development in the Western
European movement toward imposing corporate criminal
liability when the French legislature in 1992 enacted a
revised penal code that included a new statutory scheme
for imposing criminal liability on corporations.116 The
French legislature had previously rejected a more modest
proposal put forward by a reform commission in 1974 to
impose criminal liability on corporations in the area of
commercial, industrial, and financial activities.117 The 1992
penal code provisions introducing corporate criminal
liability were the product of years of discussion among
legislators, legal scholars, and other interested parties,
including representatives of the business community.118
114. One commentator has termed this “organizational failure” liability, in
which liability is attributed to the corporation where management’s conduct did
not directly cause the offense but its failure to properly organize the corporation
allowed the offense to occur. Roth, supra note 110, at 20.
115. Coffee, supra note 70, at 23; see also Bouloc, supra note 82, at 235.
116. See Bernard Bouloc, Coup d’oeil sur la responsibilité pénale des personnes
morales, Revue Lamy Droit des affairs, no. 71 (May 2004), 5, at 5 (noting that the
introduction of corporate criminal liability was the most significant innovation in
the new penal code); Orland & Cachera, supra note 73, at 121-23 (observing that
opposition to corporate criminal liability was finally overcome).
117. Bouloc, supra note 82, at 237. While the debate regarding the imposition
of criminal liability on corporations in the economic field was occurring, the
French government was increasingly imposing civil and administrative
restrictions on corporations in the economic sphere. In 1972, 1973, and 1974, the
French legislature, through a series of laws, “began to intervene” to protect
consumers from “abuses” of market position committed by distributers. See id. at
237-38. In 1977, France’s Economy Minister was given the power to impose
sanctions on corporations for violations of consumer protection and market
competition laws. See id. at 237. And as noted supra note 84, by the early 1980s,
the French government had imposed quasi-criminal liability on corporations in a
few areas.
118. See infra note 261.
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The introduction of comprehensive criminal responsibility
on corporations brought forth “reservations and criticism”
from the corporate classes.119
1. The Statutory Basis for Criminal Responsibility of
Legal Entities, Including Corporations
The basis for corporate criminal liability in French law
is codified in article 121-2 of the new French penal code,
which states: “Juridicial persons, with the exception of the
State, are criminally liable for the offenses committed on
their account by their organs or representatives . . . in the
cases provided for by statute or regulations.”120 Article 121-2
further provides the “criminal liability of legal persons does
not exclude that of the natural persons who are perpetrators
or accomplices to the same act.”121 This clause appears to
respond directly to the critique—raised during the early
legislative process that led to the adoption of the 1992 penal
code—that corporate liability could be used to shield
corporate officers and directors from criminal liability.122
2. The Prerequisites for the Imposition of Criminal
Liability on Legal Entities
There are three basic requirements for liability to be
imposed under article 121-2. First, the French legislature
must have enacted a substantive criminal offense which
119. Bouloc, supra note 82, at 237-38. In response to the enactment of
corporate criminal liability, the National Association of French Employers issued
a study addressing the new legal implications of such liability for corporations.
See Pierrick B. Le Goff, The French Approach to Corporate Liability for Damage
to the Environment, 12 Tul. Euro. & Civ. L.F. 39, 39 n.117 (1997).
120. Art. 121-2, reprinted in Recueil Dalloz, Code Penal (Dalloz 2004). Article
121-2 is available in English at http://www.legifrance.gouv.fr.
121. Id.
122. Gerard Couturier, Répartition des responsabilités entre personnes
morales et peronnes physiques, 111 Revue des Societes (Dalloz, April-June 1993),
at 307. See Bouloc, supra note 116, at 5, 8 (noting that the Court of Cassation has
stated that personal liability may exist coterminously with corporate liability,
without the need to establish a distinct fault on the part of either the individual
or the corporation not committed by the other).
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the corporation contravened.123 Second, actual criminal
responsibility for the offense must lie in the conduct of a
corporation’s representatives or its organs.124 Third, the
acts on which criminal liability is predicated must have
been committed for the benefit of the corporation.125 The
Criminal Chamber of the Court of Cassation is still
clarifying the second and third of these requirements—that
the criminal act be done by certain representatives or units
(“organs”) of the corporation and that the act be done for
the corporation’s benefit.126 The scope of corporate liability
inevitably turns on how the Court of Cassation chooses to
define a “representative” and an “organ.”
a. A Corporation’s “Representative”
The term “representative” means a high ranking
officer or an agent or employee with delegated authority
from a corporate officer. Therefore, criminal offenses
committed by such persons on behalf of the corporation will
give rise to criminal liability.127 The legislature, when
enacting article 121-2, did not originally envisage that a
corporation could be held criminally liable based on the
conduct of lower level employees.128

123. Le Goff, supra note 119, at 60; Orland & Cachera, supra note 73, app. B,
at 141.
124. As one commentator has stated, the natural person is the obligatory
means toward imposing criminal liability on a corporation. Jacques Leroy, Droit
Penal General, ¶ 444, at 287 (Librarie Générale de Droit et de Jurisprudence
2003) (“La personne physique est, ainsi, le passage obligé de la mise en oeuvre de
la responsibilité pénale des personnes morales.”).
125. Art. 121-2 (“offenses committed on their account”). However, actions
taken primarily for the benefit of the actor, as opposed to the corporation, cannot
be the basis for corporate liability. Bouloc, supra note 82, at 240. Obviously, this
test is one that is forever subject to difficulty at the margins, when the intent of
the individual actor and the interests of the corporation merge. See Bouloc, supra
note 116, at 5, 7.
126. See Bouloc, supra note 82, at 240 (discussing ambiguity of the term
“representative”). Professor Coffee has noted that the degree of managerial
involvement, the role of collective entity knowledge, and the absence of negligence
remain undefined factors under article 121-2. Coffee, supra note 70, at 24.
127. Leroy, supra note 124, ¶ 447, at 288-89.
128. Mireille Delmas-Marty, supra note 72, at 304; Bouloc, supra note 82, at
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However, it is unclear whether the legislature
intended for the corporation to be liable for offenses
requiring a showing of intentional fault where it can be
shown that a corporation’s representative had the
necessary state of mind for the offense (through intent,
knowledge, or willful blindness), but the criminal act was
committed by another person without immediately
delegated authority. Much to the dismay of some scholars,
the Court of Cassation initially rejected such an approach,
instead requiring that full criminal responsibility lie with a
corporate representative in order for criminal responsibility
to be imputed to the corporation.129 Since then, however,
240.
129. See Leroy, supra note 124, ¶ 447 (citing Cass. crim., 11 May 1999, Droit
pénal, comm. no. 140 (deuxième espèce), note M. Vérnon; Cass. Crim. 26 June
2001, Bull. crim., no. 161). Delmas-Marty, in an article published after the
passage of article 121-2 but before its implementation, argued that it was possible
to interpret the new law as separating the “moral element” of an offense from the
“material element,” and imposing liability on the corporation for the conduct of
lower level employees when the “moral element” (i.e., fault or state of mind) of the
offense lay with a corporation’s representative or its board of directors. DelmasMarty, supra note 72, at 304. Another commentator noted that a lower court in
Lyon originally took such an approach, but the Court of Cassation quickly noted
its disagreement and required the establishment of personal liability as a
predicate for corporate liability. Jean-Claud Planque, Note, Influence de loi du 10
juillet 2000 sur la responsabilité pénale des personnes morales, Commentaires
Dalloz, no. 6, at 514, 515-16 (citing Cass. Crim., 2 Dec. 1997, Bull. crim., no. 408;
Cass. Crim. 7 July 1998, Bull. crim., no. 216). This commentator has also called
for the legislature to clarify article 121-2 so that corporate criminal responsibility
is autonomous of personal responsibility. Id. at 518. See also Leroy, supra note
124, ¶ 447, at 288-89 (suggesting that corporate fault should not simply “ricochet”
off of personal liability, and proposing the imposition of criminal liability on a
corporation in cases where it is poorly structured so as to permit the commission
of an offense). See also Circular of May 14, 1993, Commentaries on Legislative
Provision of the Nouveau Code Pénal and on Provisions of Law of December 16,
1992, as translated in part in Orland & Cachera, supra note 73, at 139-62 (noting
that “a personne morale might be found criminally responsible in the absence of
deliberate willfulness of its corporate bodies or officers, and this is contrary to the
1978 proposal submitted by the Revision Committee. Personnnes morale might,
indeed, be prosecuted for offenses of negligence or imprudence . . . .”). But see
Circular of May 14, 1993, as translated in Orland & Cachera, supra note 73, at
148 (“[I]t can be said that a personne morale can be held criminally responsible as
a main perpetrator, when its corporate bodies or officers have . . . carried out, as a
main perpetrator, the moral and material elements of the offense.”). The Circular
was drafted “under the auspices of the Ministry of Justice in consultation with a
task group composed of judges, law professors, lawyers and police
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the Court of Cassation has relaxed this rigid requirement
in certain cases.130
A July 2000 amendment to article 121-3 of the new
penal code effectively expanded the scope of liability for
criminal negligence under article 121-2. The July 2000
amendment made natural persons indirectly liable for
negligence-based offenses because of their failure to take
measures to prevent the offense (by deliberately ignoring a
duty of care or other statutory obligation imposed on
them).131 Criminal negligence may now be imputed to a
corporation because of the negligence of one of its officers,
even when that person was not personally involved in the
offense. The Court of Cassation, however, still appears to
require that actual negligence on the part of a corporate
representative is established.132

representatives.” Orland & Cachera, supra note 73, at 137. A Circular, which is
not a legislative document, may not be cited by a French court as the legal basis
for a decision. Id. at 138.
130. Planque, supra note 129, at 516 (citing J.-H. Robert, Chron. dr. pénal, JCP
2000, I, no. 289).
131. Prior to its amendment, article 121-3 provided:
A misdemeanour also exists, where the law so provides, in cases of
recklessness, negligence, or failure to observe an obligation of due care or
precaution imposed by any statute or regulation, where it is established
that the offender has failed to show normal diligence, taking into
consideration where appropriate the nature of his role or functions, of his
capacities and powers and of the means then available to him.
The July 2000 amendment added the following paragraph:
In the case as referred to in the above paragraph, natural persons who
have not directly contributed to causing the damage, but who have created
or contributed to create the situation which allowed the damage to happen
who failed to take steps enabling it to be avoided, are criminally liable
where it is shown that they have broken a duty of care or precaution laid
down by statute or regulation in a manifestly deliberate manner, or have
committed a specified piece of misconduct which exposed another person to
a particularly serious risk of which they must have been aware.
Art. 121-3, as enacted through Act no. 1996-393 of 13 May 1996 art. 1 Official
Journal of 14 May 1996; and amended by Act no. 2000-647 of 10 July art. 1
Official Journal of 11 July 2000.
English translation available at
http://www.legifrance.gouv.fr.
132. An October 2000 decision of the Court of Cassation, interpreting article
121-3 and article 121-2, as well as worker safety laws, held that a corporation
could be criminally liable for the injury to a worker caused by the conduct of the
director of a factory if it could be shown that the corporate representative was
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b. A Corporation’s “Organ”
The conduct of “organs” of a corporation may also be
imputed to the corporation to establish criminal
responsibility. An “organ” is an organization within the
corporation that is formally identified in the French
corporations law, such as its board of directors or its
shareholders (e.g., acting through a shareholder meeting).133
The extent of liability that may be imposed on a corporation
because of the actions of one of its organs appears to turn on
the question of whether decision makers within the organ
must themselves be identified in the commission of the crime,
or whether it is enough to identify the collective actions of the
persons within that unit as responsible. Once again, the
Court of Cassation took a narrow reading of the code, and was
reluctant to permit liability without identifying culpable
individuals within the corporate organ.134 Under this narrow
approach, even where a board of directors is collectively
responsible for the commission of an offense, liability will not
be imputed to the corporation unless one of the board’s
members is found to be personally responsible for the
commission of the offense.135 This interpretation is so
constrained that it renders the concept of “organ” nearly
coextensive with the concept of “representative.”
personally negligent under article 121-3. See Jean-Claude Planque, supra note
129, at 515-16 (citing Cass. crim., 24 Oct. 2000, Bull. crim., no. 308). Planque has
suggested that the amendment to article 121-3 creates tension with the basic
theory of liability under article 121-2, as originally articulated by the Court of
Cassation, which requires criminal responsibility to lie entirely with a natural
person who acts on behalf of the corporation. See generally id.
133. Leroy, supra note 124, ¶¶ 446-447, at 288-89. The term is highly
problematic, in that it appears to include persons who can be representatives but
may not include certain board, managerial, and shareholder bodies in more
modern French corporate law. Leroy, supra note 124, ¶ 447, at 288-89.
134. Leroy, supra note 124, ¶ 446, at 288 (citing Cass. crim., 11 May 1999,
Droit pénal, comm. no. 140 (deuxième espèce), note M. Vérnon).
135. See Leroy, supra note 124, ¶ 446, at 288. However, one 1998 decision of
the Court of Cassation suggested that it may be possible to impose liability even
in the absence of a clearly identified wrongdoer within the corporation if the
nature of the offense and the circumstances of its commission make its
imputation to the corporation reasonably certain. Id. at 288 (citing Cass. crim., 1
Dec. 1998, Bull. Crim., no. 325).
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3. Substantive Corporate Offenses under French Law
Although the formal elements of criminal liability
under article 121-2 remain uncertain, the French
legislature has continued to expand the list of substantive
offenses for which a corporation may be liable. When first
proposed through a legislative reform commission in 1974,
criminal liability was originally to be imposed in the areas
of commercial, industrial, and financial activities, and
quasi-criminal liability was imposed in these areas before
1992.136 The newly enacted article 121-2, however, by
operation of other parts of the French code, reaches many
more substantive areas, including antitrust offenses and
environmental crimes.137 By 2001, liability was expanded
to include commercial torts, unsafe working conditions, and
even new areas such as homicide, rape, and human rights
abuses caused by corporate actors.138
4. Statutory Sanctions for Corporate Offenders
Another important feature of the new French law is
that it provides an expansive list of statutory criminal
penalties. In most cases, these will be monetary penalties
five times the rate for natural persons committing the same
136. See supra notes 84 and 117 and accompanying text.
137. See Le Goff, supra note 119, at 60-63 (discussing interplay of article 121-2
with environmental laws); id. at 60 (noting application of article 121-2 to
antitrust and worker safety laws); Orland & Cachera, supra note 73, at 141-46
(generally listing substantive corporate criminal offenses).
138. Olivier Sautel, La Mise en oeuvre de la responsabilité pénale des
personnes morale: entre litanie et liturgie, Le Dalloz 2002, no. 14, at 1147; see
also Revue de science criminelle et de droit pénal comparé (4), Dalloz Oct.-Dec.
2001, at 843 (reviewing new legislative enactments of substantive offenses);
Orland & Cachera, supra note 73, at app. B, 141-46 (listing offenses). This
expansion of substantive liability has caused one commentator to argue that
French corporate criminal liability has become “totally incoherent” and to
recommend that the legislature adopt a general system of criminal liability that
makes criminal corporate liability more “rationale” and “predictable.” Sautel,
supra, at 1147-48. Playing on the French term for “juridicial person” (“personne
morale”), Sautel has suggested that the expansion of substantive corporate
liability has “left no doubt” that “personnes morales have become personnes
immorales capable of killing, injuring, and raping.” Id. at 1148.
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offense, with greater monetary penalties for recidivist
The penal code also includes some other
conduct.139
penalties available to a court in extraordinary
circumstances. These include judicial supervision of a
corporation’s affairs for a period of five years (e.g., the
ability to enter a contract), a five-year ban on the issuance
of publicly financed corporate bonds, limitations on the use
of checks and credit to make payments, confiscation of
assets which facilitated or were gained from the offense,
posting of notices throughout the media, publication of the
judgment in a registry, and, in extreme cases, dissolution of
the corporation.140
D. Movement Toward Corporate Criminal Liability in
Germany
Unlike France, Germany has not overcome its
longstanding opposition to the imposition of criminal
liability on artificial entities. Interestingly, resistance to
the imposition of corporate liability appears to come from
scholars and jurists more concerned with the “purity” of the
notion of blame and fault in the criminal law than with the
effects on corporations of imposing criminal-style sanctions
on them.141 Today, corporate misconduct still is addressed
through
administrative
sanctions
imposed
by
139. Orland & Cachera, supra note 73, app. A at 129, 132, 135 (citing articles
131-38, 131-41 and 132-12 through 132-15 of the French penal code); Bouloc,
supra note 82, at 246-47.
140. Orland & Cachera, supra note 73, app. A at 130 (citing article 131-39 of
the French penal code); Bouloc, supra note 82, at 247; Le Goff, supra note 119, at
60-61 (noting the establishment of “a specific register containing the criminal
record of legal entities” and other offenses designed to compensate for the fact
that corporations “cannot be imprisoned”). Cf. Michael Faure & Günter Heine,
Environmental Criminal Law in the European Union (Max Planck Institute
2000), at 127 (noting that more severe sanctions against corporations are
“substitutes for imprisonment” and therefore should not be available unless a
prison sentence could be imposed on a person guilty of the same offense).
141. Mark Pieth, International Developments, in Criminal Responsibility of
Legal and Collective Entities, supra note 70, at 113, 116 (“[T]he fear [of German
scholars] is that essential safeguards of both substantive and procedural law
would be put at risk” from derogations of the “principle of personal guilt or
blameworthiness.”).
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administrative bodies and supervised by criminal courts.
Corporations can face fines of millions of euros and other
sanctions that are quasi-criminal in status,142 such as
confiscation of illicit gains or property used to facilitate
offenses.143
Because of German law’s emphasis on
classifications, severe sanctions may be imposed on
corporations in administrative proceedings as long as they
are classified formally as “monetary fines” imposed for
“order violations,” rather than “punishments” for
“crimes.”144
Although corporate officers and directors are subject to
criminal liability for their own acts145 and the acts of
corporate subordinates,146 some German prosecutors and
academics have noted that corporations have learned to
structure transactions so as to avoid the imposition of
liability on directors and officers.147 Others have noted that
142. Roland Hefendehl, Corporate Criminal Liability: Model Penal Code
Section 2.07 and the Development in Western Legal Systems, 4 Buff. Crim. L.
Rev. 283, 286 (2000); Heine, supra note 72, at 174-75.
143. H.J. Hirsch, La Criminalisation du Comportement Collectif–Allemagne, in
Criminal Liability of Corporations, XIVth International Congress of Comparative
Law, supra note 75, at 31, 62-64. Sanctions are increasingly common in the areas
of commercial and environmental law. Id. at 32. Some administrative violations
may even carry sanctions such as restrictions on activities, revocations of licenses
and concessions. Id. at 48. In limited cases, when a corporation’s conduct
transgresses fundamental criminal law or other law and poses a danger to
society, it may be subject to dissolution. Id. at 47.
144. See Dubber, supra note 73, at 17 & n.71.
145. German prosecutors attempted to pursue sanctions against four directors
of the former Mannesmann Corporation for approving a pay-out package of $66
million for senior management in the Vodaphone takeover of Mannesmann.
Mark Landler, Deutsche Bank Executive to Have His Day in Court, N.Y. Times,
October 18, 2003, at C3. However, a German court acquitted the directors on
July 22, 2004. Mark Landler, Corporate Pay Case Ends in Acquittal, N.Y. Times,
July 23, 2003, at W1.
146. Heine, supra note 72, at 177.
Cf. Jurgen Meyer, Comments on
Developments in Germany, in Criminal Responsibility of Legal and Collective
Entities, supra note 70, at 129, 129 (noting that criminal law provides for
individual liability for corporate offenses in the areas of fraudulent tender offers,
capital investment fraud, tax evasion, breach of export laws, manufacture and
distribution of products harmful to health, industrial environmental pollution and
dumping, and money laundering).
147. Klaus-Dieter Benner, A Description of the Legal Practices in Germany, in
Criminal Responsibility of Legal and Collective Entities, supra note 70, at 53, 5455. Because of this liability scheme, German criminal law may fail to reach
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the increasing size of large corporations makes it difficult
to identify the individual culpable of the offense.148
Moreover, German law “limits the class of natural persons
whose acts may make the corporation liable” under
administrative or civil law to its legal representatives and
directors,149 so identification of the person who committed
the offense is unlikely to result in liability of the
corporation. Criminal liability that may ultimately fall on
a lower-level employee for his own criminal conduct does
little to deter corporate misconduct. When an employee is
convicted of an offense and is fined, the corporation may
reimburse the fines, further diluting the effect of the
criminal law.150
It is not surprising, then, that some German
prosecutors and scholars believe that individual criminal
liability does not obviate the need for the imposition of
criminal liability on corporations.151 German scholars have
corporations engaged in crimes ranging from financial fraud schemes to the
dumping of toxic wastes. Id.; Harald Kolz, Aspects of Legal Practice in Germany,
in Criminal Responsibility of Legal and Collective Entities, supra note 70, at 67,
67-68. German academics have traditionally played an important role in the
development of the criminal law. See Dubber, supra note 73, at 7-8.
148. Hirsch, supra note 143, at 33. One commentator noted that, “[e]ven in
cases where the prosecuting authorities have established without a doubt that a
criminal offense has been committed by and in the interest of a company, illegal
dumping of waste or water pollution for example, complex organisational
structures and company hierarchies mean that it is often not possible to ascertain
with sufficient certainty who the individual offender is and to call them to
account. To an increasing degree, we are seeing an ‘organised’ or structural lack
of individual responsibility.” Meyer, supra note 146, at 130. This commentator
further notes that an increasing number of criminal prosecutions for
environmental offenses are being dismissed by the prosecutor’s office. Id.
149. Coffee, supra note 70, at 23.
150. Gerd Eidam, Aspects of Legal Practice in Germany, in Criminal
Responsibility of Legal and Collective Entities, supra note 70, at 59, 64-65; Hirsh,
supra note 143, at 33 & n.9 (noting that the corporation’s partial reimbursement
of fines incurred by an employee by a corporation “does not constitute a
connivance at evasion” under German law).
151. See, e.g., Benner, supra note 147, at 56-58 (noting German companies find
it cheaper to pay fines incurred than to comply with the law); Hefendehl, supra
note 142, at 283-84 (noting that European scholars may be over-emphasizing
doctrinal opposition to corporate liability and that corporate misconduct is
increasingly the subject of concern among scholars); Meyer, supra note 146, at
132 (proposing corporate criminal sanctions similar to those proposed by the EU’s
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proposed different theoretical models for the imposition of
criminal liability. Some have suggested an alternative to
the Anglo-American respondeat superior theory of liability,
and have examined an “organizational fault” model.152
Under this model, liability is premised on the identification
of a deficiency in the organizational structure that caused
the offense.153 While this would address the problem raised
by the conscious attempt of a corporate hierarchy to turn a
blind eye toward misconduct at lower levels in the
organization, the doctrine is broader, and reaches negligent
failure by management in supervising the corporation. The
corporation would be liable for the commission of an offense
if its structure is deemed inadequate to respond to the risks
created by its operational conduct.154 Proponents favoring
this model of liability argue that corporate misconduct is
not always the result of a deliberate managerial choice to
ignore the law but the result of several acts by lower level
employees and organizations within the corporation, “the
sum of . . . which constitute the offense.”155 They also
suggest that the greater social injury caused by corporate
misconduct requires a conceptual approach to corporate
crime that is not constrained by the identification of a
responsible person, as is required by more traditional
theories of liability.156
At some point, one other feature of German criminal
law may also come into play in the debate over whether to
create corporate criminal liability. The theory of positive
general prevention, which has become the dominant theory
of punishment in Germany, defines the function of criminal
1988 proposal and available in French law, including publication of judgment,
prohibition on advertising, and dissolution).
152. Heine, supra note 72, at 182-83; Hefendehl, supra note 142, at 297-98
(discussing Bernd Schünemann’s proposal to abandon the principle of personal
guilt for corporate criminal liability).
153. Heine, supra note 72, at 182-83.
154. Heine, supra note 72, at 182-83; Hefendehl, supra note 142, at 297-98.
155. Eidam, supra note 150, at 65.
156. Hefendehl, supra note 142, at 293 (noting Schünemann’s view that the
“collective act patterns” of corporations are inconsistent with individual guilt, and
that the “danger to legal rights protected by the criminal law increases in the
field of” corporate conduct).
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punishment as “bolstering the lawabidingness” of the
population.157 Although this theory has traditionally been
focused on individuals, it might also be extended to
corporate persons, as a means of enhancing their “‘general
legal consciousness.’”158 This theory seems to bear some
resemblance to the arguments of American theorists that
criminal law serves an expressive or social meaning
function.159
E. European Transnational
Criminal Liability

Proposals

for

Corporate

In recent years, transnational European organizations
have begun to recommend that member states impose
criminal or quasi-criminal liability on corporations for
specific types of offenses through the member states’ own
legal regimes. Some of the developments from two key
organizations, the Council of Europe and the European
Union (“EU”) will be discussed here, because they provide
insight into a strain of influential European thought, and
may anticipate the direction of corporate criminal liability
in the European member states (whose representatives
comprise the governing bodies of these organizations).160 It

157. See Dubber, supra note 73, at 20.
158. See id. at 21.
159. These arguments are developed supra at text accompanying notes 61-63.
Note, however, that positive general prevention developed independently of, and
partially in response to, Karl Binding’s norm theory. See Dubber, supra note 73,
at 18-19.
160. We will discuss some of the recommendations of the Council of Europe and
the European Union. The Council of Europe is a loose association of European
states across the continent. From time to time, the Council will produce
conventions that attempt to standardize member states’s social and legal
practices. See http://www.coe.int (“about the Council of Europe”). These
conventions are legally binding on member states that ratify them, although
many ratify them with reservations. See id. (“about conventions”).
The European Union (“EU”) is a smaller group of European nations that
form a common economic market to standardize economic policies, national fiscal
policies, and trade policies. Increasingly, the EU is attempting to standardize
policies in the areas of the environment and in legal spheres affecting economic
relations, such as intellectual property and corporate governance. The EU is also
attempting to address criminal activity of concern to all member states, such as
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should be noted, however, that the proposals for corporate
liability discussed in this section have yet to be fully
implemented by member states.
1. Proposals of the Council of Europe
a. Proposal for Standardization of Enterprise
Criminal Liability
In 1988, the Council of Europe passed a
recommendation that member states study the need to
standardize criminal “enterprise” liability among the
member states.161 The Council noted that its proposal was
in response to several factors: the “considerable damage”
caused by “criminal offences committed in the exercise of
the activities of enterprises,” the difficulty in identifying
responsible individuals within the corporation due to the
complexity of the corporate structure, and the desirability
of placing criminal responsibility on the corporation
benefitting from illegal activity.162
The Council’s recommendation was significant in three
respects. First, the Council “favor[ed] a negligence-based
approach to corporate criminal liability.”163 The Council
recommended imposing liability for offenses committed in
the course of corporate activities, unless it could be shown
that “management [was] not implicated in the offence and
[had] taken all the necessary steps to prevent its

financial crimes, foreign exchange crimes, and political corruption of EU bodies.
Policies and laws, in the form of directives and regulations, are proposed by the
EU’s executive body (the Commission), and adopted by its legislative bodies (the
European Parliament and the Council of the European Union). The Parliament
and Council can modify and reject proposals of the Commission. Laws and
regulations in various legal, social, and economic spheres require member states
to harmonize or modify their laws consistent with the relevant directive or
regulation. See http://www.europa.eu.int/institutions.
161. See Liability of Enterprises for Offenses, Recommendation No. R (88) 18,
adopted by the Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe on 20 October of
1988, available at http://www.coe.int.
162. Id.
163. Coffee, supra note 70, at 35.
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commission.”164 Second, as would later appear in article
121-2 of the new French penal code, the Council explicitly
noted that corporate criminal liability should not displace
the liability of natural persons, particularly managers.165
Third, the Council’s recommendation proposed sanctions on
corporations that included alternatives to monetary fines,
such as the removal of managers, the appointment of
“provisional caretaker management” by a court,
disgorgement of illegal gains and property used to facilitate
offenses, prohibition on public contracts, denial of public
fiscal benefits, prohibition on advertising goods or services,
publication of the judgment, and closure or winding-up of
the corporation.166 The Council’s 1988 recommendation has
not been adopted by the member states, possibly because
doing so would have required them to address the doctrinal
resistance in their legal systems to the imposition of
corporate criminal liability. As we have noted, such
doctrinal resistance continues in states such as Germany
and Italy.167
b. Proposal
for
Corporate
Environmental Offenses

Liability

for

Subsequent proposals for corporate liability targeted
specific fields of social and economic activity. In 1998, the
Council of Europe approved for signature by member states
the Convention on the Protection of the Environment
through Criminal Law. Articles 2 and 3 of the convention
identify a series of intentional and negligent offenses
involving unlawful discharges into the air, soil, and water,
and unlawful manufacture, transportation, and storage of
hazardous materials, among other offenses.168 Article 9 of
164. Liability of Enterprises for Offenses, Recommendation No. R (88) 18,
supra note 161, ¶¶ 1-5.
165. Id. ¶ 5.
166. Id. ¶ 7. See also Möhrenschlager, supra note 74, at 95-96.
167. See supra notes 75 and 141, and accompanying text.
168. European Treaty Series No. 172, Convention on the Protection of the
Environment through Criminal Law, 4 Nov. 1998, arts. 2 and 3, available at
http://www.coe.int.
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the convention recommends that member states impose
criminal liability on corporations, but it also gives them the
option of imposing administrative sanctions.169 Individual
criminal liability is not displaced.170 The preamble to the
convention notes that “imposing criminal or administrative
sanctions on legal persons can play an effective role in the
prevention of environmental violations.”171
One
commentator has noted that the convention’s proposal for
corporate criminal liability appears influenced by the new
French law, in that it makes an entity criminally liable for
acts committed by its representatives or its “organs.”172
France, Germany, and eleven other member states have
signed the convention, but only Estonia has ratified it.173
c. Proposal for Corporate Liability for Offenses
Involving Corruption
In 1999, the Council of Europe put forward for
signature a Criminal Law Convention on Corruption. The
Convention identifies a series of offenses related to bribery
of domestic and foreign public officials, including officials in
international organizations.174
Article 18 states that
signatory parties are to adopt measures “necessary to
ensure that legal persons can be held liable for the criminal
offences of active bribery, trading in influence and money
laundering.”175 Like the convention on the environment,
the convention on corruption predicates corporate liability
on the acts of a representative or organ of the
corporation.176 But the convention on corruption expands
the scope of corporate liability to cases in which the “lack of
supervision or control” by corporate management makes
169. Id. art. 9; Ringelmann, supra note 109, at 400.
170. European Treaty Series No. 172, supra note 168, art. 9.2.
171. European Treaty Series No. 172, supra note 168, at preamble.
172. Möhrenschlager, supra note 74, at 103.
173. http://conventions.coe.int (convention on environmental law).
174. European Treaty Series No. 173, Criminal Law Convention on Corruption,
27 Jan. 1999, arts. 2-12.
175. Id. art. 18.
176. Id. art. 18.
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the offense possible.177 Individual criminal liability is not
displaced.178 Although the title of the Convention refers to
criminal law, it permits countries to use quasi-criminal or
administrative sanctions, rather than criminal sanctions.
Parties are required to adopt “effective, proportionate and
dissuasive criminal or non-criminal sanctions” against
corporate offenders who commit any of the identified
offenses.179 The Convention has been ratified and entered
into force by thirty countries. Significantly, however,
France, Germany, Italy, and Switzerland have not ratified
it, and Spain has not even signed it.180
2. Proposals of the European Union
a. Administrative Liability for Anti-competition
Offenses
One of the first European transnational agreements to
impose liability on corporations was the 1957 Treaty of
Rome, which established a common market for goods and
services by the 1960s that was known as the European
Economic Community (comprised originally of Belgium,
Germany,
France,
Italy,
Luxembourg,
and
the
Netherlands).
The EEC is the precursor to today’s
European Union. Articles 81 and 82 of the Treaty of Rome,
as amended, prohibit anti-competitive conduct within the
common market.181
Specifically, article 81 prohibits
restrictive agreements and concerted activities, and article
82 prohibits abuses of dominant market positions.182 The
177. Id. art. 18.2. This standard is similar to the standard in the Council’s
1988 proposal, which recommends an examination of whether management acted
negligently. See supra text accompanying note 164.
178. Id. art. 18.3.
179. Id. art. 19.
180. http://conventions.coe.int (convention on corruption).
181. As originally enacted, articles 81 and 82 were numbered articles 85 and
86. They were renumbered by the Treaty of Amsterdam Amending the Treaty on
European Union, the Treaties Establishing the European Communities, and
Certain Related Acts, signed on 2 October 1997, and available at
http://www.europa.eu.int/eur-lex/en/treaties.
182. James S. Venit, EU Competition Law—Enforcement and Compliance: An
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EU’s executive body, the Commission, is empowered to
investigate companies engaging in anti-competitive
conduct, to enjoin conduct, and to impose heavy
sanctions.183 Sanctions have become increasingly higher,
with one sanction reportedly exceeding US $300 million on
a company found to have engaged in an illegal marketsharing cartel.184
Although the sanctions imposed by the Commission
are civil fines, some commentators have suggested that the
sanctions are so severe as to be criminal in nature.185
Regardless of how one characterizes them, it is fair to
suggest that the role and nature of these sanctions appear
to have influenced member states’s attitudes regarding the
imposition of penal liability on corporations under their
own legal regimes. Even in countries that continue to
resist the imposition of corporate criminal liability, such as
Italy and Germany, quasi-criminal administrative
sanctions that follow the EU model have been introduced.186
b. Council Framework Decision
Environmental Offenses

Regarding

The Council of the European Union has adopted a
“Framework Decision” requiring member states to impose

Overview, 65 Antitrust L.J. (Fall 1996), at 81, 82-84.
183. Id. at 84-85.
184. Id. at 86.
185. See Möhrenschlager, supra 74, at 98 (noting that some scholars have
argued that the fines, although deemed civil, resemble criminal sanctions and
therefore are outside the scope of the Commission’s authority).
186. Italy, for example, has replicated EU anti-competition sanctions through
passage of a 1990 law, with an administrative authority empowered to impose
fines on corporations. One Italian scholar, commenting on the Italian anticompetition fines, noted that “we cannot escape the structural analogy between
these fines and those which are envisaged for corporations in the penal systems of
common law. On the one hand, this indicates that types of direct responsibility
for collective bodies exist also in countries which are still tied to a traditional
negation of the criminal capacity of corporations. On the other hand, this analogy
expresses the uncertainty of labeling the nature of sanctions, thereby confirming
the necessity of reconsidering the bases of criminal responsibility for collective
subjects.” Militello, supra note 75, at 183.
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liability on legal entities for environmental offenses.187 The
Framework explicitly cites the Council of Europe’s 1998
convention on the environment and borrows from it in
several respects. First, it identifies a series of intentional
and negligent offenses regarding unlawful discharges and
production, storage, transportation, etc., of hazardous
materials.188 Second, it recommends that member states
adopt measures to impose criminal liability on legal
persons based on acts of their representatives and
organs.189 The Council’s Framework also recommends
liability in cases where there is a lack of supervision or
control in the corporation that “made possible the
commission” of the offense.190 Although the Framework
decision encourages the imposition of criminal liability, it
does not appear to be mandatory, since member states have
the option of imposing criminal or civil fines and other
“effective, proportionate and dissuasive sanctions,” such as
disqualification from certain industrial or commercial
activities, or even judicial supervision and winding-up of
the corporation.191 Third, the Framework Decision states
that corporate liability should not “exclude criminal
proceedings against natural persons who are perpetrators,
instigators or accessories” in the identified offenses.192
The Council adopted its Framework Decision in lieu of
a directive proposed for its adoption by the Commission.
The Commission’s proposed directive appears to leave
member states with less discretion in imposing criminal
liability on legal persons, which may have been one reason
187. Council Framework Decision 2003/80/JHA of 27 Jan. 2003 on the
Protection of the Environment Through Criminal Law, in Official J. Eur. Union,
at L 29/55.
188. Compare id. arts. 2 and 3 with ETS 172, supra note 168, arts. 2 and 3.
189. Compare Framework Decision 2003/80/JHA, supra note 187, art. 6, with
ETS 172, supra note 168, art. 9.
190. Framework Decision 2003/80/JHA, supra note 187, art. 6.2. Similarly, the
Council of Europe’s convention directs member states to impose negligent-based
liability on corporations for environmental offenses. ETS 172, supra note 168,
arts. 3 and 9.
191. Framework Decision 2003/80/JHA, supra note 187, art. 7.
192. Compare Framework Decision 2003/80/JHA, supra note 187, art. 6, with
ETS 172, supra note 168, art. 9.2.
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the Council ultimately declined to adopt it.193 In response,
the Commission took the unusual step of asking the
European Court of Justice to annul the Framework
Decision on the basis that the Council did not rest its
action on the appropriate legal grounds found in EU treaty
law.194 It is unclear why the Council adopted a Framework
Decision after rejecting the proposed directive. It is
possible, however, that the public’s outrage at the oil spill
in November 2002 caused by the Prestige tanker off the
coasts of Spain and France195 pressured the Council to
adopt some type of measure with respect to corporate
environmental offenses.
c. Proposal for a Directive Involving Corruption
Offenses
In 2001, the Commission of the European Union
recommended that member states adopt corporate criminal
liability to combat fraud and “corruption” (i.e., bribery)
directed at the use of European Union funds and money

193. See generally Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of
the Council on the Protection of the Environment through Criminal Law of March
13, 2001, COM (2001) 139, as amended on September 30, 2002, COM (2002) 544.
The preamble to the proposed directive states: “Although Community law may, in
certain cases, already require Member States to provide for criminal penalties
with regard to article 10 EC, currently there is no Community provision which
requires expressly this type of sanction. As a consequence, there is not only a
lack of certainty of the law with regard to the Member States’s obligations to
provide for criminal penalties, but there is no minimum standard or acquis
communautaire with regard to offences to the detriment of the environment.”
194. The Legislative Observatory of the EU, at http://www.europarl.eu.int
(Identification reference no. COD/2001/0076). According to the Commission, the
appropriate legal basis for establishing criminal penalties for environmental law
community-wide is article 175 of the Treaty establishing the European
Community, referred to as the “first pillar” of Community law. The Framework
Decision, however, rests on title VI of the Treaty on European Union relating to
judicial cooperation in criminal matters, referred to as the “third pillar.” The
Commission expressed doubt that the “third pillar” provides an appropriate “legal
basis for requiring Member States to provide for criminal penalties for
environmental offences.” Id. (entry of March 3, 2003).
195. France Targets Tanker Spill Culprits, BBC News Europe, January 2,
2003, at http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/europe/2622855.stm.
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laundering.196 The Commission noted that the “sheer
extent” of injury to the Community’s financial interests
from such conduct made tougher sanctions “a matter of
urgency.”197
The Commission’s proposal encompasses
liability based on negligence. Pursuant to the proposal,
corporate liability exists (1) when such offenses are
committed by a representative of the corporation or person
with authority to act on behalf of the corporation or (2)
when the offense resulted from a lack of supervision or
control within the corporation.198 Obviously aware of the
continued resistance among some member states toward
imposing full corporate criminal liability, the Commission
stated that “changes need to be made . . . to national
legislation, so that bodies corporate can be held responsible
for acts of fraud, active corruption and money laundering
. . . that damage or threaten to damage the financial
interests of the Community.”199 Although the proposed
directive expresses a strong preference for the
criminalization of such conduct,200 it permits member states
to adopt non-criminal sanctions against corporations, so
long as they are “effective, proportionate and dissuasive.”201
With respect to natural persons who perpetrate corruption
offenses, the directive states that corporate liability should
not “exclude criminal proceedings against natural persons
who are perpetrators, instigators or accessories in the
fraud, active corruption, or money laundering.”202

196. Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on
the Criminal-Law Protection of the Community’s Financial Interests, COM (2001)
272 (issued May 23, 2001), arts. 3, 4 and 6.
197. Id. explanatory memorandum, ¶ 1.
198. Id. art. 9.
199. Id. preamble, ¶ 11.
200. “Member States shall take the necessary measures to transpose the
provisions of this Chapter [defining offenses] into their national criminal law in
such a way that the conduct referred to therein constitutes criminal offences.” Id.
art. 7. However, whereas article 8 of the proposed directive, id., requires that
responsible individuals (e.g., corporate officers) should be criminally liable, article
9 only requires that “bodies corporate” be “held liable,” thus leaving room for
member states to proceed administratively or civilly against corporations.
201. Id. art. 11.
202. Id. art. 9.3.
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d. Proposals related to Corporate Accounting
Fraud
On the heels of the Parmalat accounting scandal, the
Commission issued a proposal for a directive requiring
member states to adopt EU-wide standards for public
This
directive
included
a
company
audits.203
recommendation that member states adopt “dissuasive civil,
administrative or criminal penalties” against auditors and
audit firms in addition to civil sanctions in cases in which
statutorily required audits failed to comply with the
proposed EU-wide standards.204 One proposed sanction
would withdraw “the approval of statutory auditors and of
audit firms,”205 which would be the death knell of a public
company audit firm.
Interestingly, however, the
Commission’s overall approach to the recent corporate fraud
scandals in Europe has not focused on the use of criminal
sanctions.206 Similarly, France, Germany, and Italy have

203. Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on
Statutory Audit of Annual Accounts and Consolidated Accounts, issued March 16,
2004, COM (2004) 177, available at http://www.europa.eu.int/eur-lex.
204. Id. art. 30, ¶ 2.
205. Id. art. 30, ¶ 3.
206. Partly in response to this wave of corporate fraud (and also as a result of
the EU’s policy to harmonize corporate governance in public companies among
member states to promote more efficient capital markets), in May 2003, the
Commission recommended that member states adopt new rules requiring
increased financial transparency, greater shareholder rights, and more defined
criteria for director remuneration and responsibilities. See Communication from
the Commission to the Council and the European Parliament of May 21, 2003,
“Modernising Company Law and Enhancing corporate Governance in the
European Union—A Plan to Move Forward,” COM (2003) 284. However, the
Commission did not propose additional criminal liability on directors, officers and
auditors responsible for public company accounting fraud. Here, the Commission
declined to follow the policies of Sarbanes-Oxley, enacted less than a year earlier
by the United States Congress. See id.; see also Frits Bolkestein, member of the
EU Commission’s group on the Internal Market, Address to the European Policy
Forum London, (June 13, 2003), available in LEXIS at 2003 RAPID June 13,
2003. The Commission’s recommendations reflected its view that the wave of
scandals indicated a need for fundamental corporate governance reform rather
than a criminal law response.
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made civil rather than criminal law the centerpiece of their
responses to the recent corporate fraud scandals.207
III. THE IMPLICATIONS OF THE EUROPEAN EXPERIENCE
As the preceding discussion demonstrates, there are
several identifiable trends in Western Europe regarding
the imposition of criminal liability on corporations. There
has been a general movement toward the imposition of
corporate criminal liability, with the use of respondeat
superior liability in addition to other liability standards
that focus on managerial or organizational fault. The new
corporate criminal liability is intended to complement, not
replace, the liability of individual actors.
Europe
increasingly views corporate criminal liability as a needed
deterrent and as a mechanism for condemning certain

207. In July 2003, the French legislature adopted legislation requiring greater
transparency in financial statements and stricter auditing standards. The
legislation also required more disclosure of director stock holdings in the
corporation. Luca Enriques, Bad Apples, Bad Oranges: A Comment from Old
Europe on Post-Enron Corporate Governance Reforms, 38 Wake Forest L. Rev.
911, 919 (2003). This legislation emulated much of Sarbanes-Oxley’s financial
reporting disclosure requirements. Id. The legislation also introduced criminal
liability on non-traditional securities brokerage firms involved in certain public
market investment activities in violation of the new requirements, and predicated
such liability on article 121-2 of the new French penal code. Traditional
investment banks, such as Crédit Agricole S.A., and investment firms associated
with the French bourse remain subject to strict regulations imposed elsewhere in
French law on such firms. Art. 44 of the Projet de loi de securite financiere
(adopted by the French Senate Mar. 20, 2003), available at
http:/www.senat.fr/leg/tas02-092.html.
The German government has proposed legislation emulating SarbanesOxley’s disclosure and auditing requirements. The proposed legislation would
also make it easier for shareholders to bring actions for damages against
individuals responsible for securities fraud. Enriques, supra, at 920-21. A
government commission is even exploring more fundamental reforms to the
structure of the German corporate board. Id.
Italy also adopted new reforms aimed at curbing self-dealing by directors
that were due to come into effect in January 2004. Enriques, supra, at 924-25.
However, Italy still has not completely reversed the “de-criminalization” of
accounting and securities fraud that occurred in 2001, when the government
passed legislation that made the prosecution of corporate officers for fraudulent
accounting much more difficult by imposing a higher burden of proof on
prosecutors and shortening the statute of limitations. Id. at 922.
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corporate conduct and reinforcing societal norms. Finally,
the use of criminal sanctions other than traditional
monetary fines, while still not widespread, is now available
to courts in at least one European country.
The general movement toward imposing criminal
liability began in the 1970s with legislation addressing a
few offenses (particularly offenses relating to the economic
markets and consumer protection208) and has now led to the
adoption of comprehensive schemes for the imposition of
criminal liability on corporations in Denmark, Finland,
France, the Netherlands, and Switzerland.209 The use of
corporate criminal liability was endorsed by the Council of
Europe, which recommended in 1988 that member states
adopt such liability comprehensively,210 and subsequently
forwarded specific proposals addressing the criminal
liability of corporations for environmental offenses and
offenses involving fraud in government contracts.211 The
European Union has made similar proposals of its own.212
A few European countries have bucked the trend,
choosing not to adopt corporate criminal liability, and
instead employ administrative sanctions.213 In Germany
these sanctions are regarded as quasi-criminal.214 It is
questionable whether the hold-outs will continue to rely
exclusively on civil or quasi-criminal sanctions. Legal
commentators and prosecutors in these countries,
especially Germany and Italy, have argued that
208. See supra notes 75, 84, 89, 117, 180-186 and accompanying text (noting
original use of criminal or quasi criminal sanctions for economic crimes in France,
Italy, Spain, the Netherlands, and the EU). Portugal also imposed vicarious
liability on corporations for certain environmental and economic crimes. See
supra note 74.
209. See supra notes 89-119 and accompanying text.
210. See supra text accompanying notes 161-65.
211. See supra text accompanying notes 168-79. The European Union arguably
began the modern discussion of corporate liability in Europe when the original
EU body imposed civil sanctions on business enterprises for anti-competition
abuses in the 1960s. See supra notes 181, 185-86 (noting debate regarding penal
nature of of EU’s anti-competition fines).
212. See supra text accompanying notes 187-202.
213. See supra note 75 and notes 141-44 and accompanying text (noting that
Germany, Italy, and Spain continue to use administrative sanctions).
214. See supra notes 142-44 and accompanying text.
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administrative sanctions are less effective than criminal
liability because they do not provide sufficient deterrence
and do not inflict moral condemnation on the corporate
offenders.215 Moreover, at least in Germany, individual
criminal liability is provided for the commission of offenses
on behalf of the corporation, but it has not been effective at
controlling criminal conduct by corporations.216
The second trend among those Western European
countries adopting comprehensive liability schemes is the
attempt to define a standard of fault that integrates
respondeat superior liability with theories of corporate
organizational fault. The Netherlands, Denmark, and
subsequently Finland have opted to impose respondeat
superior liability as well as liability based on
organizational or management failures.217 Switzerland has
recently adopted respondeat superior liability for serious
offenses that is qualified by requiring an additional
showing that the corporation has not taken reasonable
measures to prevent the offense.218 This qualification is
also seen in the Council of Europe’s 1988 proposal.219
France remains an exception to the trend, using a limited
form of respondeat superior liability, although in the case
of negligence-based offenses, the courts are relaxing that
standard.220
215. See supra notes 147-51 and accompanying text.
216. See supra notes 146-48 and accompanying text.
217. See supra text accompanying notes 92-93 (the Netherlands), notes 100-105
(Denmark), and notes 107 (Finland).
218. See supra notes 112-114 and accompanying text.
219. See supra text accompanying note 164.
220. French law does not automatically impute criminal liability to a
corporation based on the conduct of its lower-level employees, but requires a
finding of individual criminal liability by senior management or delegated
corporate representatives, except in the case of negligence offenses, where the law
may impute liability to a corporation even when a senior officer is not personally
liable for the offense. This approach recognizes that it may be unfair to impose a
criminal judgment on a corporation for the acts of any lower-level “rogue”
employee. Coffee, supra note 70, at 23. As discussed in the preceding section,
French law is very much in flux, as courts and scholars recognize that the
extremely strict interpretation of article 121-2 originally adopted by the Court of
Cassation does not appear to be practical in the case of most corporate offenses
requiring intentional fault, and is in tension with negligence-based liability
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The third noticeable trend concerns the maintenance
of liability of natural persons: the states that have chosen
to adopt comprehensive corporate criminal liability have
not displaced the liability of natural persons for offenses
they commit on behalf of the corporation.221 Similarly,
various proposals of the Council of Europe and the
European Union for corporate criminal liability state that
individual liability on culpable managers should remain.222
Thus, the introduction of criminal responsibility on
corporations is seen as serving practical and moral
purposes that are distinct from those served by the
imposition of criminal responsibility on individuals acting
on a corporation’s behalf.
Finally, and relatedly, the scholarly commentary
urging the adoption of corporate criminal liability has
consistently reflected two purposes that scholars believe
can only be served by the criminal law. The first is the
infliction of moral condemnation on the corporation itself
when it commits an illegal act.
Such condemnation
reinforces important social norms flouted by the
corporation. Some scholars have, accordingly, argued that
the corporation represents a set of distinct interests, or has
its own personality, and is therefore the appropriate
subject of criminal stigma.223

imposed on corporations through recent modification of article 121-3. See supra
notes 127-35 and accompanying text.
221. This is the case in France and the Netherlands, see supra text
accompanying notes 94, 121-22, and appears to be the case in Denmark, see supra
text accompanying notes 100-105 (Danish law does not appear to exlude
individual liability when a corporation is liable) and Switzerland, although, as
noted, the new Swiss provision for corporate criminal liability may deflect liability
away from the corporation and back to the individual. See supra notes 108-114
and accompanying text. Belgium, however, has not followed this trend. See
supra note 74.
222. See supra text accompanying note 165 (Council’s 1988 proposal), note 170
(Council convention on environmental crimes), note 178 (Council convention on
corruption), note 192 (EU Framework Decision on environmental offenses), and
note 202 (proposed EU directive on corruption).
223. See supra note 75 and notes 80, 83, and accompanying text (noting
comments of Italian and French scholars on distinctive harm created by corporate
offenses).
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The second of these purposes is an effective response to
the widespread social harm caused by the illegal activities
of increasingly economically dominant corporations.
Several European commentators have remarked that
neither administrative corporate liability nor individual
criminal liability on corporate management has succeeded
in deterring recidivist corporate misconduct, and that more
punitive sanctions against corporate offenders are
required.224 Proponents of such sanctions have succeeded
in having them adopted in France. These sanctions include
measures designed to restrict management’s conduct of the
corporation’s business and have been characterized as a
form of corporate “imprisonment.”225
Although nonmonetary sanctions, such as revocation of licenses, were
already available in countries such as Germany for
administrative law violations,226 the new sanctions appear
to provide more muscular deterrence against corporate
misconduct.
What do the European developments tell us about the
arguments reviewed in section I? At the most general
level, the widespread adoption and expansion of corporate
criminal liability in Europe suggests a widely shared
perception that corporate criminal liability serves a
valuable function in modern western democracies. The
European experience also provides a lens through which to
reassess the specific critiques of subjecting corporations to
the criminal law. In considering these developments, we
return to the major arguments we identified in section I.
A. The European Experience and the Retributive Critique
The retributive argument we reviewed in section I
asserts that the function of criminal law is to impose
blame, and shame, on individuals as a means of responding
to the moral wrong inflicted by their conduct.227 According
224.
225.
226.
227.

See supra notes 146-48 and accompanying text.
See supra note 140.
See supra notes 143-44 and accompanying text.
See supra text accompanying notes 39-41.
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to this line of reasoning, the criminal law cannot be
extended to corporations without losing its moral
foundation, and hence its moral force. Twenty-five years
ago, most European nations shared the traditional notion
that criminal sanctions were, by their nature, appropriate
only for natural persons,228 and this view still holds sway in
the few European nations that have not extended criminal
liability to corporations.
In Italy, for example, the
constitution provides that criminal responsibility “is
personal,”229 and in Germany opposition to criminal liability
is predicated, at least in part, on the principle of personal
guilt and blameworthiness.230
But, in the main, this jurisprudential concern has not
carried the day in Western Europe. As detailed in section
II, the clear trend is to extend criminal liability to
corporations, and the recommendations of the Council of
Europe and the European Union are likely to reinforce the
trend. Moreover, the European trend also shows an
attempt by legal scholars to un-moor corporate criminal
liability from the classical notions of individual fault that
are central to the retributive argument. In Germany, for
example, scholars have argued for a standard of corporate
criminal liability based on a theory of organizational
fault,231 and some French scholars have expressed the view
that France’s limited respondeat superior liability does not
reflect the realities of the interaction between a
corporation’s management and its employees.232
The developments in Europe reflect a growing
recognition of the economic power wielded by corporations
as well as the distinctive threats posed by that power, and
a sense that criminal liability should be available to
228. See supra note 72. But see supra note 70 (noting that the U.K. adopted a
limited form of criminal responsibility based upon respondeat superior in the
1950s), note 71 (Denmark had limited liability since 1926) and notes 89-90 and
accompanying text (the Netherlands had limited corporate liability for economic
crimes, and expanded it to comprehensive criminal liability in 1976).
229. See supra note 75.
230. See supra note 141 and accompanying text.
231. See supra text accompanying notes 152-56.
232. See supra note 129 and accompanying text.

BEALEMACRO.DOC

142

BUFFALO CRIMINAL LAW REVIEW

2/9/2005 4:11 PM

[Vol. 8:89

Although the
respond to corporate wrongdoing.233
Europeans do not necessarily phrase it in these terms, it
seems that the underlying assumption is utilitarian and
pragmatic: the notion that society needs additional
protection from corporate wrongdoing than has been
provided by reliance on administrative or civil law. One
commentary on the Danish criminal code makes this point
explicit:
The justification for making legal persons liable for
punishment is found in practical needs, including above all
a desire to be able to sanction anonymous faults and to be
able to adjust the level of a fine to the actual or assumed
profit of a business (and not merely the financial situation
of the perpetrator). This is particularly called for where the
actual perpetrator is a person in an inferior position
receiving only a minor salary who has acted in the interest
of the business.234

There is, however, also some discussion of the need to
hold corporations responsible, and to express society’s
denunciation of certain forms of corporate misconduct. The
expressive function and social meaning of the new
European criminal laws is discussed below.235
B. The European Experience and the Economic Efficiency
Critique
As described more fully in section I, the law and
economics efficiency critique is utilitarian in its orientation,
seeking to weigh the costs and benefits of corporate
criminal liability as opposed to corporate civil liability or
criminal liability for individuals.
One facet of this

233. See supra text accompanying notes 83-87.
234. Langsted et al, supra note 98, at 48, ¶ 81. The authors also comment that
“Danish legislation as well as jurisprudence of penal law have traditionally been
highly pragmatic, and philosophical considerations regarding guilt depending
upon human actions and similar points of view have never gained much ground.”
Id. at 47-48, ¶ 81.
235. See infra text accompanying notes 281-84.
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argument is the claim that criminal liability is inefficient
because it overdeters, causing precautionary behavior that
is not socially beneficial.236 Another facet is the claim that
the heightened procedural protections and reputational
damages cause unnecessary and sometimes perverse social
costs.237
Because the sanctions available and the
procedures followed in each country in civil and criminal
proceedings vary a good deal,238 the exact balance of costs
and benefits varies from country to country as well.
Accordingly, no close comparisons can be made between the
utilitarian balance in the U.S. and that in Europe.
There is, however, one distinction between the U.S.
and European systems that may have predisposed the
latter to turn to criminal sanctions as a mechanism to
control corporate misconduct. In comparison to the U.S.,
European states have traditionally relied more on
administrative regulation239 and less on civil litigation to
236. See supra text accompanying notes 42-43.
237. See supra text accompanying notes 45-51.
238. For a general discussion of criminal procedure in Western European
countries, see Craig M. Bradley, Criminal Procedure, A Worldwide Study (1999).
Some of the procedures in the U.S. and Western Europe are similar. For
example, most countries have a heightened standard of proof in criminal cases,
although each may use different terminology. In France, jurors must be
thoroughly convinced of guilt to convict. Id. at 173. England, like the U.S., uses
beyond a reasonable doubt. Id. at 122. Jurors in Germany decide guilt based on
factors which leave no room for reasonable doubt. Thomas V. Mulrine, Note,
Reasonable Doubt: How in the World Is It Defined?, 12 Am. U.J. Int’l L. & Pol’y
195, 220 (1997). The Italian Constitution requires a definitive conviction (Id. at
222), although recently the Italian Supreme Court has applied a standard that is
comparable to the reasonable doubt standard. See also Michele Taruffo,
Rethinking the Standards of Proof, 51 Am. J. Comp. L. 659 (2003) (arguing that
while there is some overlap in the criminal and civil standards of proof in civil
countries, generally, civil courts do not use as rigorous a standard as criminal
courts). But see Kevin M. Clermont & Emily Sherwin, A Comparative View of
Standards of Proof, 50 Am. J. Comp. L. 243 (2002) (arguing that most civil law
countries use a heightened standard of proof for both civil and criminal trials).
239. In the last century, Western European countries chose to regulate
corporate conduct primarily through administrative liability. See Leigh, supra
note 70, at 1522 (noting the availability of a “wide measure of administrative
liability” in European countries, including those that do not have criminal
liability); Beth Stephens, The Amorality of Profit: Transnational Corporations
and Human Rights, 20 Berkeley J. Int’l L. 45, 64 (2002) (noting that after the
French Revolution, corporate criminal liability “fell into disfavor,” in part because
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control and sanction corporate conduct in areas such as
protection of consumers,240 the environment,241 and business
competition.242
The civil remedies available in many
European nations are underdeveloped as compared to those
in the U.S. In some contexts, private plaintiffs may sue for
injunctive relief, but not compensatory damages.243 In
other contexts, compensatory damages are available, but
not punitive damages.244 Thus the addition of corporate
criminal liability may reflect, in part, the Europeans’

“corporate-style institutions were disbanded”).
240. France and Italy, for example, enforce consumer protection laws through
“strong, detailed regulation, largely sanctioned through criminal or
administrative law measures.” Frauke Henning-Bodewig, Unfair Competition
and Misleading Advertising: The Approach to Regulation in the Continental EC
States (Including the EC Directive on Misleading Advertising), 54 Antitrust L. J.
551, 555 (1985).
241. Throughout Western Europe, environmental laws are enforced through
administrative regulations and sanctions, though with varying degrees of
deterrent effectiveness.
See generally Michael Faure & Günter Heine,
Environmental Criminal Law in the European Union (Max Planck Institute 2000)
(canvassing member state environmental criminal law regimes).
242. In the area of competition laws, “both the German laws and the
competition rules of the European Economic Community provide for heavy
penalties.” Leigh, supra note 70, at 1523.
243. Germany, Austria, Italy, Spain and Switzerland, for example, have
granted consumer associations standing to seek injunctions without damages
against businesses for violations of consumer law, such as misleading advertising.
Gerhard Walter, Mass Tort Litigation in Germany and Switzerland, 11 Duke J.
Comp. & Int’l L. 369, 375 (2001); Harald Koch, Non-Class Group Litigation Under
EU and German Law, 11 Duke J. Comp. & Int’l L. 355, 359-60 (2001). Some
states, such as Norway and Sweden, have a “Consumer Ombudsman” that may
seek to enjoin business practices. Koch, supra, at 362.
244. Although some countries have adopted procedures that allow the award of
compensatory damages to groups of injured plaintiff groups in tort cases,
European systems have not generally authorized punitive damages. See Koch,
supra note 243, at 360-61 (noting difference between public interest style suits
and claimant group suit in tort cases). There are already some indications,
however, that European nations may move further to expand civil liability.
Courts in France and Greece have begun to award punitive damages in civil suits
brought by associations. Id. at 360. Increasingly, the European Union is also
recommending that member states adopt private plaintiff civil actions against
corporations in various fields, such as securities law. See, e.g., COM 2003/284,
supra note 206, ¶ 3.1.3 (proposing shareholder right to seek official investigation
into company’s affairs); COM 2004/177, supra note 203, art. 30 (encouraging
member states to provide “effective, proportionate and dissuasive civil,
administrative or criminal penalties” against audit firms).
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greater reliance on the state, rather than private litigants,
to respond to corporate misconduct. In effect, criminal
liability has given the state the option of seeking more
serious sanctions to respond to greater societal harm.
In addition, several other points emerge from the
European experience. First, some aspects of the new
legislation seem to take account of efficiency
considerations, broadly defined, since they impose criminal
liability on the corporation where other options are limited
or unavailable. Some of the corporate criminal statutes
were designed to plug a gap in the existing legal
framework, as in the case where no responsible individual
Similarly, German scholars and
can be identified.245
prosecutors are advocating corporate criminal liability on
the ground that corporations are able to structure their
transactions to avoid most individual liability, and further
dilute the deterrent effect of the current laws by
indemnifying the few individuals who are prosecuted.246
More generally, Europe clearly intends corporate criminal
liability to serve as an additional tool, not a substitute for
other—possibly
more
effective—sanctions
against
247
corporations themselves or individuals.
On the other hand, as far as we can tell, the European
dialogue concerning the creation of corporate criminal
liability shows little sign of the influence of law and
economics considerations, such as the relative efficiency of
245. See, e.g, supra text accompanying note 90 (noting that Dutch law has
dispensed with predicating corporate liability on conduct of a natural person),
notes 103 and 107 (noting Danish and Finnish law, respectively, do not require
identifying individual wrongdoer who performed the corporate offense), and notes
108-114 (noting that under Swiss law, corporation liable for some offenses where
individual wrongdoer is not identified, and always liable for certain serious
offenses regardless of individual liability).
246. See supra notes 147-50 and accompanying text.
247. See supra text accompanying notes 165, 170, 178, 192, and 202 (noting
that Council of Europe and European Union initiatives do not displace individual
liability and also contemplate civil and administrative remedies). This does not
guarantee, however, that in practice the availability of corporate liability will not
tend to shield individuals. See Khanna, supra note 54, at 17-18, 21-23, 8 n.40
(arguing that in the U.S., corporate interests favor corporate liablity and lobby
against increased enforcement of individual liability, although formally there is
no barrier to individual liability).
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different legal options, or concerns about perverse
incentives or the potential for under- or overdeterrence.
The push to adopt criminal sanctions reflects a consensus
that new and stronger tools are needed to respond to the
potential for widespread damage from corporate
misconduct,248 but there is relatively little systematic
discussion of the distinctive costs and benefits to enacting
or enlarging corporate criminal liability. Although some
opponents of corporate criminal liability in France
expressed concern that criminal sanctions would be
redundant of existing administrative fines and would fall
heavily on shareholders, employees, and creditors,249 those
arguments do not seem to have received the same thorough
and critical discussion given to doctrinal arguments in the
U.S. against corporate criminal liability. This lack of
emphasis might reflect the conclusion that criminal
sanctions are efficient, or that efficiency concerns are not
an appropriate basis for assessing the propriety of criminal
sanctions, but it seems equally plausible that European
scholars have not employed law and economics scholarship
to analyze these questions.250
248. This view is reflected on the national level, see, e.g., supra note 75
(Paliero, arguing for corporate criminal law in Italy, noted that the “more
invasive activities” of corporations cannot be controlled without punitive
sanctions), and at the broader transnational level, see, e.g., supra text
accompanying notes 161-62 (Council of Europe endorsed criminal liability because
activities beneficial to corporations were causing considerable damage for which
responsible officials could not be identified), and at the level of the EU, see supra
text accompanying notes 196-97 (Commission finding that injury to EU’s financial
interests made tougher sanctions for bribery of European Union funds and money
laundering urgent).
249. See supra note 88 and accompanying text.
250. It appears that law and economics scholarship plays a less prominent role
in Europe than in the United States. For example, there are eight law and
economics journals in the U.S., and only one in Europe. Richard A. Posner, Law
and Economics in Common-Law, Civil-Law, and Developing Nations, 17 Ratio
Juris. 66, 66 n.1 (2004). In describing the wide influence law and economics
scholarship has in the U.S. and arguing that it can play a similar role in civil law
countries, Judge Posner seems to imply that it has not yet achieved this
prominence outside the U.S. See id. at 66-67. In general, it appears that to date
European law and economics has been more concerned with private law than with
public law. See, e.g., Ugo Mattei, Comparative Law and Economics (1997)
(discussing, inter alia, property, private trusts, and torts).
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The European move towards corporate criminal
liability also reflects, among some proponents, a sense that
criminal sanctions express and reinforce certain social
norms. The impact of expressing and reinforcing social
norms can, of course, be factored in a utilitarian calculus,251
but we did not observe European commentators discussing
the normative value of criminal sanctions against
corporations in these terms. The expressive and norm
building functions of criminal law, as argued by European
commentators, are discussed below in subsection D.252
C. The European Experience and the Public Choice
Critique
As noted in section II, a public choice perspective
suggests that corporate criminal liability may be enacted
not because it is an effective and important response to
corporate wrongdoing, but rather because it is relatively
inefficient or ineffective, and hence the least objectionable
to politically powerful corporate interests.253 Corporate
liability is thus dangerous in both the legislative and
prosecutorial contexts, because it will tend to substitute for
more effective sanctions, leading to underdeterrence of
corporate wrongdoing.
Extending this analysis
internationally, we might predict that powerful corporate
interests in Europe, like those in the U.S., will employ their
political influence to steer the system towards corporate
criminal liability only when it serves their interests to do
so. This bleak picture of the legislative process suggests
that it will seldom be the case that one can find desirable
models in the statutory laws of any democratic nation
(though the common law may produce efficient rules254).
251. For a forceful statement of this position, see Kahan, supra note 62, at 617;
see also supra text accompanying notes 62-63.
252. See infra text accompanying notes 280-85.
253. See supra text accompanying notes 54-56. Consistent with this theory, it
appears that corporations have raised stronger opposition to criminal liability for
corporate agents and to civil liability for entities than to corporate criminal
liability. See supra note 56 and accompanying text.
254. Law and economics scholars have traditionally argued that the common
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Although there is certainly some explanatory power in
the public choice critique of the U.S. legislative process,
this analysis cannot be transferred directly to the
experience in Europe.
Because the various western
democracies have different political traditions and culture,
as well as different governmental structures and
institutions (including key variations regarding the
strength of political parties and the distribution of legal
sovereignty), the role of interest groups in each varies.255
Even allowing for this variation, it seems clear that the role
of interest groups in European politics is not entirely
comparable to the role of such groups in U.S. policies. The
relative weakness of the party system in the U.S.
contributes to the power of U.S. interest groups, which
have much more influence in the electoral process than
their counterparts in Europe.256 There are significant
law evolves toward efficient rules. See generally Richard A. Posner, Economic
Analysis of the Law 25-26, 573-75 & n. 1 (6th ed. 2003); Oona A. Hathaway, Path
Dependence in the Law: The Course and Pattern of Legal Change in a Common
Law System, 86 Iowa L. Rev. 601, 637-38 (2001). In recent years, however,
various challenges to this view have been made. See, e.g., Hathaway, supra, at
638 (observing that path dependence theory suggests that rules such as stare
decisis may preclude common law courts from reaching efficient results), and
Todd J. Zywicki, The Rise and Fall of Efficiency in the Common Law: A Supply
Side Analysis, 97 Nw. U. L. Rev. 1551 (2003) (noting the evolution away from the
traditional view of the common law’s efficiency because of interest group
pressures on litigation, and offering a supply side as well as a demand side
account of the pressures that shape common law decision making). For more
general evolutionary analyses of law, see E. Donald Elliott, The Evolutionary
Tradition in Jurisprudence, 85 Colum. L. Rev. 38 (1985), and Owen D. Jones,
Proprioception, Non-Law and Biolegal History, 53 Fla. L. Rev. 831 (2001).
255. Clive S. Thomas, Interest Groups in Western Democracies: Contemporary
Characteristics and Future Directions, in First World Interest Groups, A
Comparative Perspective 223-24 (Clive S. Thomas ed., 1993) [hereinafter First
World Interest Groups]. At least during periods in their history, several of the
Western European states have a corporatist structure, with well defined national
interest groups and unions that are formally consulted by the government. Clive
S. Thomas, The American Interest Group System, Typical Model or Aberration?,
in First World Interest Groups, supra, at 41 [hereinafter Typical Model or
Aberration]. See Yves Meny, Government and Politics in Western Europe 152
(Janet Lloyd trans., 2d ed. 1993). These “peak associations” organize the other
interest groups, and represent them in negotiations or enforce any agreement
that would be made; such associations are lacking in the U.S. Clive, Typical
Model or Aberration, supra, at 42.
256. Clive, Typical Model or Aberration, supra note 255, at 43. The U.S. PACs
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differences in the relationship between interest groups and
government in the U.S. and various European nations, and
in the tactics and strategies that interest groups use to
influence government.257
Moreover, as noted by comparative political science
analysts, some of the European nations that have enacted
corporate criminal liability have bureaucracies that are
more insulated from interest groups, and also have political
party systems that are much more powerful than the party
system in the United States. In particular, France has a
powerful executive, an insulated bureaucracy, and parties
that are not likely to be controlled by special interests.258
Although business leaders (and representatives of trade)
are among the most likely to be consulted, French political
leaders with clear policy preferences are generally
successful in imposing these views.259 In this situation the
government may consult the affected groups as a formality,
but if interest groups are not consulted or if their positions
are not influential, they have little recourse but to
protest.260 This appears to have been the case with the
1992 adoption of the French provisions creating
comprehensive corporate criminal liability. Despite the
opposition of the business community, the legislature
followed the recommendation of the French law reform
commission.261 Subsequently, in July 2000, the French
strengthen the relationship between groups and individual elected officials or
candidates, decreasing the strength of political parties in the U.S. Id. at 41. The
weak political parties contribute to the “fragmented nature of the American
policymaking process.” Id.
257. Id. at 49. Several key mechanisms used by interest groups in the U.S.,
such as paid professional lobbyists, are less prevalent in Europe. Id. at 37, 39.
Influencing the election of candidates through PACs, which tend to represent
business interests, is virtually unheard of in other western democracies. Id. at
46. PACs tend to be dominated by business interest groups, and tend not to
represent the interests of promotional groups, i.e., public interest or single-issue
groups promoting a social ideal or cause, such as the ACLU or Mothers Against
Drunk Driving. Id. at 41.
258. Frank L. Wilson, France: Group Politics in a Strong State, in First World
Interest Groups, supra note 255, at 114-15, 122.
259. Id. at 124-25.
260. Id. at 125.
261. In an interview with one of the co-authors, Marie-Christine Monsallier-
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legislature expanded negligence-based corporate criminal
liability, placing into question the Court of Cassation’s
overly narrow reading of the scope of liability under the
1992 law.262
Therefore, the development of corporate criminal
liability in the various European nations does not seem to
have followed the script suggested by the public choice
critique. The process varied considerably from country to
country in Europe,263 and seldom if ever followed the
paradigm assumed by the public choice critique—corporate
interests urging legislators to adopt criminal liability to
avoid more effective sanctions against corporations. It does
not appear that recent European legislation was a
substitute for other civil or administrative remedies or
individual criminal liability. Rather, corporate criminal
liability was seen as a necessary adjunct to existing
provisions that may or may not have more bite. This is
particularly clear in the case of Swiss law, which provides
for corporate criminal liability when fault cannot be
attributed to an individual within the organization.264
Swiss law also provides for corporate criminal liability in
the case of a group of offenses that are often facilitated by
the corporate form of organization (money laundering,
bribery, corruption, organizational crime, and the financing
Saint Mleux observed that in general, French legislative reform commissions tend
to be formed exclusively of legislators, though well known legal scholars
sometimes have significant access to legislative reform commissions. These
legislators receive informal input from both the academic community and other
representatives of affected interest groups, although the latter do not play as
central a role in the drafting of legislation as they do in the United States.
Interview with Marie-Christine Monsallier-Saint Mleux, Docteur en droit, Maitre
de conférences à la Faculté de Droit de l’Université de Lille II, in New York, New
York (June 6, 2004) (interview notes on file with authors).
262. See supra notes 131-32 and accompanying text.
263. The Netherlands and Denmark, for example, incrementally introduced
corporate criminal liability, see supra text accompanying notes 89-99, whereas
France took years to debate it before finally introducing it, for the first time,
comprehensively. See supra text accompanying notes 116-17.
264. See supra note 109 and accompanying text. Similarly, one basis for
criminal liability under Finnish law is the absence of an identified wrongdoer
coupled with the corporation’s lack of the care and diligence necessary to prevent
the offense. See supra text accompanying note 107.
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of terrorism), regardless of whether a wrongdoer has been
identified, when the corporation has failed to take
reasonable and necessary measures to prevent the
offense.265 This would suggest that with respect to such
offenses, criminal sanctions are viewed as desirable.
Further, some nations have addressed the concern that the
new provisions not act as a substitute or shield for culpable
individuals. The French code provides that a corporation’s
criminal liability does not shield a natural person who is a
perpetrator or accomplice of the same act.266 Dutch law
allows the prosecution to charge the corporation and/or the
responsible corporate official(s).267
Similarly, the European experience strays from the
public choice critique’s script in another way. That critique
suggests that criminal liability is usually the result of a
scandal that generates public outcry and a demand for a
hasty legislative response to corporate wrongdoing.268 To
the contrary, in several European countries, criminal
liability was enacted as a result of a lengthy deliberative
process in which legal scholars who supported such liability
played a significant role.
Europeans held academic
congresses to address corporate criminal liability in 1978,
1979, and 1993.269 In France, adoption came after more
than a decade of debate, as legal scholars and legislators
sought new means to hold increasingly powerful economic
entities responsible for their conduct within society.270
Similarly, in Germany much of the impetus to consider
265. See supra text accompanying notes 112-13.
266. See supra text accompanying notes 121-22.
267. See supra text accompanying note 94.
268. See Khanna, supra note 54, at 21-22 (noting that response to corporate
accounting scandals was to enact Sarbanes-Oxley, not to repeal recent limitations
on scope of civil liability). At the same time, events such as the provision of blood
tainted with HIV in France, see supra note 86 and accompanying text, and the
nuclear disaster at Chernobyl were also in important ingredient in the debate
about the need for additional laws to regulate and sanction corporate wrongdoing.
Although Chernobyl involved a government nuclear plant, it was a dramatic
example of the catastrophic harm that can occur as a result of an industrial
accident.
269. See supra note 76.
270. See supra text accompanying notes 82-88 and 115-19.
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corporate criminal legislation appears to be coming from
academics, who have noted that the current system of
administrative liability woefully under-deters corporate
offenders.271
The recent corporate accounting scandals provide an
interesting test of this aspect of the public choice analysis,
since there has been a genuine public outcry and new laws
have and are being adopted in the U.S. and Europe. But in
Europe, the result has not been knee-jerk adoption of new
criminal laws. Although a few new criminal provisions
have been adopted, both the European Union and the
individual European states have emphasized civil
provisions, particularly stricter standards for accounting
and audits, increased financial transparency, greater
shareholder rights, and defined criteria for directors’
responsibility and remuneration.272
Moreover, the European Union’s support for certain
forms of corporate criminal liability poses an additional
challenge to the public choice argument. The European
Union has called upon its member states to enact criminal
legislation to deal with four particularly pressing problems
that
characteristically
involve
corporate
activity:
environmental crimes, government contract fraud, bribery
directed at the use of European Union funds, and money
laundering.273 These proposals, which emanate from the
Commission of the European Union and must be approved
by the Council of the European Union, are the result of a
quite different political process than the national laws
referred to above. The multi-level structure of EU
policymaking creates a system that is too complex for one
type of interest group, such as business interests, to
dominate.274 The necessity of influencing multiple branches
271. See supra notes 145-50 and accompanying text.
272. See supra notes 206-07 and accompanying text.
273. See supra text accompanying notes 187-202. As noted, these are similar to
proposals made by the Council of Europe. See supra text accompanying notes
168-80.
274. The European Union has a tripartite structure, involving the Council of
Ministers, the European Commission, and the European Parliament, and
lobbyists must learn about each, and their interactions. Sam Lowenberg, For
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of government and the diffuse power structure can serve to
fragment business interests and “insulate” policymaking
from private interests compared to the more direct lobbying
Traditional
process employed in individual states.275
interest groups that had focused on lobbying national
governments found this tactic increasingly ineffective as
the EU moved toward integration, and each nation state
lost conclusive veto power after the implementation of
qualified majority voting in the Council of Ministers.276 At
the level of the EU, new nontraditional qualifications were
necessary to gain influence, such as the creation of a
“European identity” and the establishment of panEuropean alliances.277 Although business interests in the
EU are the most organized private interest in civil
society,278 their task is much more daunting than private
interests who can be successful operating at a national
level. Lobbying at the European Union has been compared
to playing three dimensional chess.279

American Businesses, Lobbying the European Union Has Become a Priority,
Legal Times, March 8, 1999, at 1. Until the admission of new states in 2004,
interest groups had to contend with fifteen different nation-states, each of whom
support different policies, social norms, and political goals, and seven different
political coalitions, none of whom controls a majority. Id. This translates into a
process that requires coalition building and compromise in order to achieve
passage of any directive or regulation.
Justin Greenwood, Interest
Representation in the European Union, 2 (2003).
275. Traditional lobbying techniques used by businesses are unsuccessful at
the EU level. The single market adopted in Europe makes bare threats by
businesses to leave the market irrelevant; legislators are rarely elected directly by
the public so constituent pressure is nonexistent; and large “war chests” do not
necessarily gain businesses more influence because wining and dining individual
politicians cannot create the political coalitions needed to advance legislation.
Lowenberg, supra note 274, at 1.
276. David Coen, The European Business Interest and the Nation State: Largefirm Lobbying in the European Union and Member States 18 J. Pub. Pol’y, 75, 77
(1998).
277. Id. at 77-78.
278. Greenwood, supra note 274, at 75.
279. Id. (quoting Brad Staples, joint managing director of APCO Europe).
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D. The European Experience and the American Defenses of
Corporate Criminal Liability
As we have noted, another group of American legal
scholars have argued that corporate criminal liability can
be justified on several grounds (although there are
additional procedural requirements). Such liability plays
an important role in expressing and reinforcing important
social norms by denouncing violations of those norms.
Such liability also serves a variety of pragmatic
considerations.280 We now turn to examining how the
European experience bears on these arguments in support
of corporate criminal liability.
1. The Role of Moral Sanction
The developments in Europe provide some support for
the notion that criminal law plays a role in reinforcing
important norms of corporate conduct and shaming or
stigmatizing irresponsible corporate actors. In the debates
leading up to the adoption of the laws in question, some
European theorists justified criminal liability on the
ground that only corporate sanctions can express society’s
moral opprobrium.281 Commentators expressed the view
that in modern economies corporate wrongdoing
represented a significant and distinctive form of
delinquency to which the law should respond. In France,
commentators expressed the view that corporations should
be held responsible, using the language of guilt and
blame.282 Consistent with that notion, one of the sanctions
authorized by French law is the posting of notices in the
media.283 Similarly, a commentator referred to the Dutch
corporate criminal sanctions as designed to inflict “grief”
and focus on “moral intention,” in contrast to the
280. See supra text accompanying notes 63-69.
281. See, e.g., supra note 75 (noting comments of Paliero and Militello) and
note 80 and accompanying text (Tiedemann discussing academic perspective).
282. See supra notes 83 and 85 and accompanying text.
283. See supra text accompanying note 140.

BEALEMACRO.DOC

2004]

2/9/2005 4:11 PM

DEVELOPMENTS IN WESTERN EUROPE

155

administrative regime’s focus on “reparation.”284 But as we
observed in discussing retribution,285 this theme may have
been less important to European proponents of corporate
criminal liability than pragmatic considerations.
2. The Adoption of Standards of Liability that
Integrate Respondeat Superior with Theories of
Organizational Failure
Some of the European nations whose corporate
liability schemes we discussed in part II are attempting to
define a standard for corporate criminal liability that will
encourage responsible corporate behavior and sanction
conduct that falls seriously short of that standard. The
Netherlands, Denmark, Finland, and, most recently,
Switzerland have adopted standards of liability that
combine respondeat superior liability with theories of
management or organizational failure. France stands
alone in adopting a far more limited standard of corporate
liability. French law permits liability to be imputed to a
corporation for offenses requiring intentional fault only
where it can be shown that a high level officer or agent is
also personally criminally responsible for the offense.286 For
negligence-based offenses, French law appears to be
284. See supra note 89.
285. See supra text accompanying notes 233-35.
286. French law is thus even more limited in the application of respondeat
superior liability to the corporation than the Model Penal Code’s formulation of
respondeat superior liability for offenses that have not been specifically imposed
on corporations by the legislature. See Model Penal Code § 2.07(1)(c) (Proposed
Official Draft 1962) (“A corporation may be convicted of the commission of an
offense if . . . the commission of the offenses was authorized, requested,
commanded, performed or recklessly tolerated by the board of directors or by a
high managerial agent acting in behalf of the corporation within the scope of his
office or employment.”) (emphasis added). Moreover, unlike the Model Penal
Code, French law only permits a corporation to be responsible for offenses that
are specifically identified as corporate offenses by the legislature. Furthermore,
for offenses specifically identified by the legislature, the Model Penal Code relaxes
the standard of respondeat superior liability. See Model Penal Code § 2.01(1)(a)
(Proposed Official Draft 1962). As discussed supra note 129 and 132, this narrow
interpretation of French corporate liability is under review by French scholars
urging its relaxation.
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adopting a more relaxed standard of respondeat superior
liability.
Although the use of respondeat superior liability was
probably borrowed from the American model of corporate
criminal liability, those countries that do use it have not
chosen to displace it with another standard of liability
when their legislatures enacted comprehensive schemes,
but instead have supplemented it. Thus, at least implicitly,
the continued use of respondeat superior liability reflects a
general consensus among legislators and perhaps even
scholars that it is an appropriate standard for corporate
liability.
At the same time, these countries, with the exception
of France, have included another component to corporate
criminal liability—an examination of management’s role in
supervising and organizing the corporation. The focus on
corporate organization has been termed the “deficient” or
“defective” organizational model. This approach permits
responsibility to be imputed to a corporation when the
corporation is unable to show that management has been
reasonably diligent in the conduct of its affairs or when the
organization of the corporation is shown to be “deficient” or
“defective” such that a responsible person cannot be
identified.287
The managerial/organizational approach
prevents a corporation from shielding itself from liability
where it is clear an offense has occurred but a responsible
individual cannot be identified, and thus reaches corporate
misconduct that vicarious liability may fail to capture.288

287. The concept of “organizational deficiency” is still being developed by legal
scholars and the courts. See supra note 114 (noting introduction of concept into
Swiss law in 2003) and supra text accompanying notes 153-54 (proposals of
German scholars for standard of liability).
Moreover, the concept of
organizational deficiency overlaps with management’s reasonable oversight and
conduct of the corporation, in that management is necessarily responsible for
corporate chains of command, the organization of different departments within
the corporation, and channels of communication.
288. This discussion is relevant in cases where the offense requires proof of at
least negligent conduct by the corporation, but is obviously inapplicable where the
law creates strict liability.
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Although these countries combine respondeat superior
liability with the management/organizational standard,
they do so in different ways.
The approach of the
Netherlands, Denmark, and Finland seemingly permits
courts to liberally apply all these theories of liability as
may suit the facts of the offense.289 The Swiss approach to
serious offenses qualifies the use of respondeat superior
liability with an examination of organizational deficiencies
and the quality of management’s oversight.290
If
management can show that it took all necessary measures
to prevent the offense, the corporation may avoid vicarious
liability for the act of an employee. As noted, French law,
as interpreted by the judiciary, does not adequately account
for organizational deficiencies or high level managerial
delinquency, but French scholars have urged a more
expansive interpretation of the law.291
It is unclear how these different standards of corporate
criminal liability will play themselves out in the actual
289. See supra text accompanying notes 91-107.
290. See supra text accompanying notes 113-14. Similarly, the Council of
Europe’s 1988 proposal permits a corporation to avoid vicarious liability when
management is not “implicated in the offense and has taken all the necessary
steps to prevent its commission.” See Council Recommendation No. R (88) 18,
supra note 161, ¶ 2 and ¶ 4. As noted, in the case of non-serious offenses, the
Swiss statute actually shields a corporation from liability for the conduct of an
employee, unless the corporation’s organization prevents the identification of a
responsible employee. See supra note 109 and accompanying text.
The Swiss approach to serious offenses and the Council of Europe’s 1988
proposal are similar to the Model Penal Code’s limitation of respondeat superior
liability based on the conduct of lower level employees, in cases in which “the
[corporate] defendant proves by a preponderance of evidence that the high
managerial agent having supervisory responsibility over the subject matter of the
offense employed due diligence to prevent its commission.” See Model Penal Code
§ 2.07(5) (Proposed Official Draft 1962).
Although the Council of Europe’s 1988 proposal for general corporate
criminal liability was not adopted, it appears to have influenced the scholarly
debate in member states. See, e.g, Möhrenschlager, supra note 74, at 94-95
(discussing the Council’s 1988 Recommendation as a “milestone”). Moreover, both
the Council of Europe and the EU’s policymakers continue to urge member states
to adopt a management-focused approach to corporate criminal liability, as
evident in their recommendations urging criminal liability for government fraud,
corruption in government contracting, and money laundering. See supra text
accompanying notes 168-202.
291. See supra notes 129-30 and accompanying text.
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prosecution of cases. On the one hand, the emphasis on
corporate organization and managerial oversight permits
prosecutors to hold corporations liable for offenses
requiring a demonstration of some degree of mens rea by
the corporation even when a responsible individual cannot
be identified. At the same time, it prevents management
from deflecting liability onto lower level employees by
structuring the corporation so as to insulate management.
On the other hand, if a corporation is able to show that its
management took reasonably necessary steps to guard
against the commission of the offense, it may be more
difficult for European prosecutors to prove liability than
their U.S. counterparts, even when the law provides for
vicarious liability.292
3. The Use of Alternative Non-Monetary Sanctions
Of equal significance to European proponents of
corporate criminal liability is the idea that new criminal
sanctions are more effective tools in attempting to manage
the potential for widespread harm as a result of the
enormous power wielded by corporations.293
Most
European countries continue to rely on monetary
sanctions.294 However, alternative sanctions are available
292. U.S. federal prosecutors are encouraged to exploit the full scope of
respondeat superior liability in pursuing criminal charges against corporations.
The fact that a corporation’s management has previously instituted a compliance
program or is being cooperative with investigators should not presumptively
weigh against an initial charging decision. Prosecutors should consider such
factors during the plea and sentencing stage. See Memorandum of Larry D.
Thompson, Deputy Attorney General, Principles of Federal Prosecution of
Business Organizations, United States Department of Justice, January 20, 2003.
Another factor that must be considered in assessing the comparative success of
prosecutions of corporations (which is beyond the scope of this article) is the
extent to which national legislatures impose strict-liability offenses on
corporations.
293. See supra note 75 (Militello discussing need to integrate corporate crime
into notion of criminal law to address corporate crime); supra text accompanying
notes 85-86 (French commentators discussing harm from corporate conduct);
supra note 151 (noting inadequacy of sanctions in Germany).
294. Switzerland’s 2003 law provides only for the use of monetary sanctions.
See Wittmer, supra note 109, § 4(e). German law, however, provides for limited
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in France and also have support from the EU, the Council
of Europe, and some German proponents of corporate
criminal liability. Both the French statute and the Council
of Europe’s 1988 proposal provide for non-monetary
sanctions that can control a corporation’s prospective
behavior in ways that civil monetary fines cannot. Some of
these sanctions seek to supervise or replace management
that was at the helm when the offense was conducted. The
French code permits a court to supervise management’s
conduct of the corporation, such as its ability to enter into
major contracts on the corporation’s behalf,295 and the
Council of Europe’s 1988 proposal goes a step further,
providing for the appointment of a replacement
management group.296 Another type of sanction restricts
the corporation’s business operations. Thus, a corporation
may be prohibited from advertising its goods and services,
prohibited from seeking to raise financing through the
issuance of debt, limited in its ability to issue checks and
lines of credit, and prohibited from receiving certain
government benefits and licenses.297
A third type of
sanction is designed to shame the corporation—such as the
announcement of a corporation’s conviction in the media or
its listing on a registry of corporate offenders.298 A final
type of sanction is the equivalent of a corporate death
penalty: both the French statute and the Council of
Europe’s 1988 proposal provide for the dissolution of a
corporation in extreme cases of criminal delinquency.299 It
remains to be seen whether French courts will utilize these
sanctions with regularity or simply apply monetary fines,
and whether other European countries will adopt some of
the more aggressive non-monetary sanctions.300
non-monetary sanctions against corporations found in violation of civil and
administrative regulations. See supra note 143.
295. See supra note 140 and accompanying text.
296. See supra note 166 and accompanying text.
297. See supra notes 140, 166, and accompanying text.
298. See supra notes 140, 166, and accompanying text.
299. See supra notes 140, 166, and accompanying text.
300. In the United States, monetary fines have been supplemented with
corporate monitoring, giving prosecutors and courts some input into corporate
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IV. CONCLUSION
The developments in Europe provide an interesting
contrast to the American experience, but it is too soon to
draw any clear lessons beyond the most basic point that
corporate criminal liability may play a more useful role in
both Europe and the United States than its U.S. detractors
believe.
European nations increasingly see corporate
criminal liability as an important option for controlling and
responding to corporate misconduct, though Germany and
Italy are important exceptions: those countries employ
quasi-criminal administrative sanctions that appear to
satisfy the EU and Council of Europe’s recommendations for
corporate liability.
There is no European consensus on the standard for
corporate liability. Although many European countries
base criminal liability on respondeat superior, it is often
complemented with liability based on organizational or
management failures. We cannot predict which theory or
theories of liability will predominate, but it seems likely
that the role of management in supervising the
corporation’s affairs and in organizing the corporation will
be an important element of European corporate criminal
liability. Significantly, German and French scholars have
emphasized an organizational or management-role inquiry
into criminal responsibility rather than focusing solely on
respondeat superior liability. Moreover, to the extent that
remedial measures. See, e.g., U.S.S.G. § 8D1.4 (November 1, 2003). As a result of
the passage of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, the 2004 amendments to the federal
sentencing guidelines emphasize the need to structure internal remedies that
promote an “ethos” or corporate ethic of compliance with the law. See, e.g.,
U.S.S.G. § 8B2.1(b)(2)-(b)(6) (increasing training requirements for corporate
compliance programs and requiring greater oversight and enforcement of same).
Such remedies can include ethics training for corporate employees. See U.S.S.G.
§ 8B2.1(b)(4). However, other non-monetary sanctions have not been widely
adopted in the United States; they have not been widely discussed by scholars,
particularly law and economics scholars, despite some creative proposals for more
effective sanctions. See Coffee, supra note 44, at 387, 413-18 (proposing replacing
monetary criminal fines with an equity fine, in which the corporation would be
required to issue a block of voting stock to a victims trust fund that could transfer
the stock without restriction).
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the EU and the Council of Europe’s recommendations in
this area influence different academic, legislative, and
judicial communities within the member states, the
message from those European intergovernmental
organizations is that the role of management should be an
important factor in drafting standards for corporate
criminal liability. The European focus on organizational
failure as a complement to respondeat superior liability
should be broadly consistent with the anticipated combined
effect of the post-Sarbanes-Oxley federal sentencing
guidelines and the respondeat superior standard of federal
criminal liability.301 This focus is also consistent with
arguments by U.S. scholars in favor of a standard such as
corporate ethos.302
It is too soon to say whether the European initiatives
will be successful in reducing or responding to corporate
wrongdoing. Many of the provisions are relatively new,
and we know little about their implementation. Moreover,
Europeans are also developing new civil and administrative
provisions, and we cannot predict which provisions will
prove to be most useful. This leads us to one final
observation. The notion of path dependence highlights the
importance of the previous developments in each legal
system, which set the stage for each subsequent set of
reforms.303
For example, we noted above that many
European nations lack some of the procedural and
substantive legal provisions that make civil litigation an
effective response to corporate behavior in the U.S. This
distinction may explain why corporate criminal liability
appears to be gaining favor in Europe, while in the U.S. its
detractors argue in favor of civil remedies. The regulatory
framework, the procedural rules, and the other remedies
that are available vary from nation to nation. Those
differences will play a role in determining the next steps
that legal systems in Europe and in the U.S. will take to
address corporate misconduct. We acknowledge that there
301. See supra notes 291, 299, and 300.
302. See, e.g., Bucy, supra note 2, at 1099.
303. See Hathaway, supra note 254, at 537-38.
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are also other significant factors our article does not
discuss—including differences in the history, traditions,
and social conditions of the various Western European
countries—that have influenced and will continue to
influence the development of the different standards of
corporate criminal liability, or its absence, among those
countries. We hope that further scholarship will shed light
on those factors, while at the same time analyzing the
continued development of the doctrines on which we have
focused.
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STANDARDS OF LIABILITY FOR CORPORATE CRIMINAL
LIABILITY AMONG SELECTED WESTERN EUROPEAN NATIONS
Country

Year Introduced and
Legislative
Codification

Respondeat
Superior

Management
and/or
Organizational
Failure

Parallel
Individual
Liability
Available

Denmark

Limited introduction in
1926, through passage
of the Butter Act;
uniform standard of
liability enacted in 1996,
as codified in section
27(1) of the Danish
criminal code;
comprehensive liability
on corporations enacted
in 2002, as codified in
section 306 of the
Danish criminal code.

Yes

Yes

Yes

Finland

1995, as codified in
chapter 9 of the revised
Finish penal code.

Yes

Yes, when there
is no identifiable
culpable
individual

Yes

France

1992, as codified in
article 121-2 of the new
French penal code

Yes, but
generally
limited to
instances
where
corporate
officers and
directors are
personally
liable

No (but note
expansion of
negligence-based
liability through
July 2000
amendment of
article 121-3)

Yes

The
Netherlands

1976, as codified in
paragraph 51 of the
Dutch penal code

Yes

Yes

Yes

Switzerland

2003, as codified in
article 100quater of the
Swiss criminal code

Yes, but only
in cases of a
specific set of
serious
offenses when
corporation
cannot show
it took
reasonable
measures to
prevent
offense;
otherwise,
not available

Yes

Yes, but
only in
cases of a
specific set
of serious
offenses;
otherwise,
availability
of
individual
liability
precludes
corporate
liability

